

Annual Report on the Remuneration of Directors



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01. Introduction



*This Annual Report on the Remuneration of Directors for 2025 (hereinafter, the "Report" or the "ARRD") has **been drawn up by the Board of Directors at the proposal of the Remuneration Committee of CaixaBank, S.A.** (hereinafter, "CaixaBank", the "Company" or the "Entity") in accordance with the provisions of Article 541 of the Spanish Capital Companies Act (the "LSC"), following the content and instructions set out in Circular 3/2021 of the Spanish Securities Market Regulator (CNMV).¹*

In this regard, the Bank has opted to prepare the Report in a free format, as in previous years, including the content required by the regulations, the statistical appendix included in Circular 3/2021, as well as other information relevant to understanding the remuneration system for CaixaBank Directors. The purpose of this Report is to provide transparency in the remuneration schemes of the Directors and to facilitate the understanding by shareholders of the remuneration practices in force in the Bank.

At the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders held on 11 April 2025, a new Directors' Remuneration Policy (hereinafter, the "Remuneration Policy" or the "Policy") was approved, with effect from the date of approval and for the years 2026, 2027 and 2028. As a result, the new Policy fully replaces the previous policy, notwithstanding the effects caused and consolidated while it remains in force.

This Remuneration Policy can be consulted on the CaixaBank website at the following link:

<https://www.caixabank.com/en/shareholders-investors/corporate-governance/remuneration-directors.html>

Without prejudice to the foregoing, for 2026 an amendment to the Directors' Remuneration Policy approved by the CaixaBank Annual General Meeting of Shareholders held on 11 April 2025 is expected to be submitted for approval by the next General Meeting of Shareholders, with the proposed changes set out in this Report.



¹ Circular 3/2021, of 28 September, of the CNMV, amending Circular 4/2013, of 12 June, which establishes the formats for the annual report on the remuneration of directors of listed public limited companies and of members of the board of directors and the control committee of savings banks that issue securities admitted to trading on official securities markets; and Circular 5/2013, of 12 June, which establishes the templates for the annual corporate governance report for listed companies, savings banks and other issuers of securities admitted to trading on a regulated market.

The main changes that require an amendment to the Policy to be approved are as follows:

1. The remuneration for Board and Committee membership for directors in their capacity as such has been updated, as well as the maximum overall remuneration limit proposed to the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders.
2. The reference to the indicative limits for variable remuneration with multi-year metrics on fixed components has been eliminated, in line with current comparable market practices, and it is now subject to the general rules for approving authorisation by the General Meeting of Shareholders, as is the case for other Identified Staff at the Company.
3. The companies that make up the sample from the financial sector for comparing and defining the remuneration for directors' executive functions have been updated.
4. The Chief Executive Officer's fixed and variable remuneration and contributions to long-term savings schemes have been updated.
5. A number of concepts in the policy have been clarified, including certain remuneration elements and other minor drafting changes that do not alter the meaning of the previous version of the policy.

Accordingly, Section 5 of this ARRD outlines the characteristics of the Policy that, as of the date of the formulation of this Report, is expected to be submitted for approval to the 2026 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders.

As established in Article 541 of the Spanish Capital Companies Act, this Report, which was unanimously approved by the Board of Directors at its meeting on 19 February 2026, will be submitted to a consultative vote by shareholders at the 2026 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders as a separate item on the agenda.



The following sections form part of the Annual Report on the Remuneration of Directors, which must be prepared by the Board of Directors and submitted for a consultative vote to the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders.



02. Governing principles and responsibilities when managing the Remuneration Policy

CaixaBank establishes the Remuneration Policy for its Board of Directors taking into account the Company's general remuneration policies, which apply to the entire CaixaBank Group across all the countries in which it operates. This policy is based on general remuneration principles aimed at achieving a market positioning that attracts and retains the necessary talent while fostering behaviours that ensure long-term value creation and sustainability.

The remuneration criteria emphasise equal pay regardless of gender or any other factors unrelated to the role. Additionally, the policy ensures that, in all cases, the minimum wage in each country is paid and that fair and living wages are guaranteed.

In particular, the policy seeks to foster the commitment of all professionals within the Bank, uphold both personal and corporate ethics and promote the strategic objectives of sustainable development.

Furthermore, market practices are analysed annually through salary surveys and specific ad hoc studies conducted by leading specialist firms. The reference samples used include European financial sector institutions and IBEX 35 companies comparable to CaixaBank.



General principles of the policy		Executive directors	Non-executive directors
Value creation	Variable remuneration not only takes account of the achievement of targets, but also the manner in which they are achieved, ensuring a prudent approach to risk management.	●	
Link between targets and the commitment of all professionals	Professional targets are defined based on the level of commitment that professionals achieve and establish with their managers.	●	
Professional development and commitment to fair pay	The remuneration policy bases its strategy of attracting and retaining talent on providing professionals with a distinctive corporate business project, the possibility of professional development and competitive overall remuneration, regardless of gender or other aspects that are not intrinsic to the job role and guarantee a living wage.	●	
Competitive positioning of total remuneration	Within its total compensation structure, the Remuneration Policy is designed to ensure a competitive positioning by combining fixed remuneration and company benefits. The policy primarily leverages these two components to attract and retain talent.	●	
Corporate benefit schemes	The principal element of the benefits package is the corporate retirement programme, which is offered to employees and stands out compared to other financial institutions in the Spanish market. This programme represents a key component of the remuneration offering.	●	
Remuneration mix	Fixed remuneration and employee benefits constitute the bulk of the overall remuneration package, in which variable remuneration tends to be conservative and moderate as it carries risk.	●	
Alignment with the General Remuneration Policy	In defining its Remuneration Policy, and particularly in setting the remuneration conditions for directors, CaixaBank has taken into account the remuneration policy applicable to the Bank's employees.	●	●
Sustainability	The policy is aligned with sustainability risk management, incorporating sustainability-related metrics into the variable remuneration component, in accordance with assigned responsibilities and functions.	●	
Non-discrimination	The Policy and its implementation must ensure non-discrimination and promote equal pay practices with regard to gender.	●	●
Career advancement	The promotions system is based on an appraisal of the skills, performance, commitment and professional merit of employees over time.	●	●
Best practices in director remuneration	The remuneration of members of the CaixaBank Board of Directors, established in the general framework defined in the Remuneration Policy, is approved by CaixaBank's competent governance bodies.	●	●

In the financial year 2025, the Board Remuneration Policy (2025-2028) submitted by the Board to the binding vote of the General Meeting of Shareholders of 11 April 2025 obtained 76.61 % of votes in favour from the voting quorum. This result was conditioned by the dissenting vote of a significant shareholder holding around 18 % of the share capital. Meanwhile, the consultative vote on the previous year's Annual Report on the Remuneration of Directors received 77.02 % of the votes in favour based on the voting quorum, mainly due to the same shareholder's abstention on this item of the agenda. A similar voting pattern was observed in the other remuneration-related items, where the same shareholder also abstained.

Excluding this single shareholder from the vote, the Remuneration Policy (2025-2028) would have been approved with 97.71 % of votes in favour and the Annual Report on the Remuneration of Directors would have been approved with 98.23 % of votes in favour. Similarly, all other remuneration-related proposals would have been approved with approval rates exceeding 99 %. Moreover, all these proposals received the support of the leading proxy advisors for institutional investors.



2.1 REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS

In accordance with the Regulation of the Board of Directors, decisions on directors' remuneration, within the statutory framework and the Remuneration Policy, cannot be delegated and fall exclusively within the remit of the full Board of Directors (hereinafter, the Board).

DIRECTORS IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SUCH

The By-laws state that the remuneration of CaixaBank directors must consist of a fixed annual amount subject to a maximum limit or cap to be determined at the AGM. This maximum amount will remain in force until the AGM agrees to change it. Accordingly, the remuneration of Board members, in their capacity as such, consists solely of fixed components.

Non-executive directors (those not discharging executive functions) maintain a purely organic relationship with CaixaBank and, as a result, do not have contracts with the company for the performance of their duties nor are they entitled to any form of termination payment should they be dismissed from their position as director.

REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS FOR THEIR EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS

Board members who hold executive functions (hereinafter, "executive directors") are entitled, under the By-laws, to remuneration for their executive duties, in addition to their remuneration as directors.

Therefore, the remuneration components for those duties are structured accordingly in light of the prevailing economic climate and the Company's earnings and results, and include the following:

- | Fixed remuneration, based on the level of responsibility and professional track record, which represents a significant portion of total remuneration.
- | Variable remuneration linked to the achievement of previously established annual and long-term objectives, as well as prudent risk management.
- | Pension schemes and other company benefits.

CaixaBank, S.A. is subject to Law 10/2014² (hereinafter, LOSS), particularly in relation to the remuneration policy for professionals whose activities have a material impact on the Company's risk profile (hereinafter, the Identified Staff). In this regard, and in line with the objective of maintaining a reasonable and prudent balance between fixed and variable remuneration components, the fixed remuneration levels of executive directors are deemed to be sufficient. The proportion of variable remuneration linked to the achievement of annual or long-term objectives is limited, not exceeding 100 % of fixed remuneration, unless the Annual General Meeting of Shareholders approves a higher level, with a maximum limit of 200 %.

In the remuneration of executive directors, there is no guaranteed variable remuneration. However, the Company may offer this guaranteed variable remuneration for new hires in exceptional cases, provided it has a healthy and solid capital base and the remuneration is applied to the first year of their contract only. As a general rule, any such exceptional application should not exceed the equivalent of one year's fixed remuneration.

² Law 10/2014, of 26 June, on the regulation, supervision and solvency of credit institutions, as amended by Royal Decree-Law 7/2021, of 27 April, transposing certain European Union directives, including CRD V

2.2 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE

Details of its composition, meetings, operation and activities during the year are set out in section 03 – Corporate Governance – Corporate Governance – Board Committees – Remuneration Committee of the consolidated Management Report.

The Remuneration Committee has been advised by Ernst & Young Abogados S.L.P. ("EY") in the preparation of the Remuneration Policy, which will be submitted for approval at the 2026 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, as well as in conducting market comparisons for directors in their capacity as such. Additionally, Willis Towers Watson has provided support with market analysis and benchmarking regarding the remuneration and compensation of executive directors and senior management.



03. Remuneration Policy for 2025

3.1 REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SUCH

The remuneration of directors in their capacity as such consists of a fixed annual amount, the maximum figure of which is established by the General Meeting of Shareholders and remains in force unless modified by the General Meeting.

The amount established by the General Meeting of Shareholders shall be used to remunerate the Board of Directors and its committees, and distributed among members, as the Board sees fit, though based on a recommendation from the Remuneration Committee. In apportioning the remuneration, the Board shall pay due regard to the duties and dedication of each member and any seats they occupy on the various committees. It shall also determine the frequency and method of payment, whether through attendance allowances, Bylaw-stipulated remuneration, and so forth. The 2025 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders agreed that the maximum annual amount payable to all directors would be €5,000,000, excluding remuneration payable for executive functions.

Accordingly, the amounts approved for membership of the Board of Directors and its Committees in 2025 and 2024 are as follows:

REMUNERATION FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE BOARD AND BOARD COMMITTEES

(thousands of €)	Total 2025	Total 2024
Base remuneration of each Board member	110.0	97.3
Remuneration of the Chair of the Board of Directors (includes base remuneration for acting as a member of Board)	1,551.0	
Remuneration of the Lead Independent Director (includes base remuneration for acting as a member of Board)	153.0	136.4
Remuneration of each member of the Executive Committee	60.0	54.1
Remuneration of the Chair of the Executive Committee	90.0	82.4
Remuneration of each member of the Risks Committee	60.0	54.1
Remuneration of the Chair of the Risks Committee	90.0	82.4
Remuneration of each member of the Audit and Control Committee	60.0	54.1
Remuneration of the Chair of the Audit and Control Committee	90.0	82.4
Remuneration of each member of the Appointments and Sustainability Committee	42.0	32.4
Remuneration of the Chair of the Appointments and Sustainability Committee	63.0	48.6
Remuneration of each member of the Remuneration Committee	36.0	32.4
Remuneration of the Chair of the Remuneration Committee	54.0	48.6
Remuneration of each member of the Innovation, Technology and Digital Transformation Committee ¹	36.0	32.4

¹The Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer do not receive remuneration for their membership of the Innovation, Technology and Digital Transformation Committee, which is included in their overall remuneration as members of the Board.

(thousands of €)	Total 2025	Total 2024
Remuneration distributed to directors in their capacity as such	4,637	3,023


For the completion of the statistical annex, which does not allow decimal values in the information, the remuneration amount for Board and Committee membership has been rounded to the nearest value, resulting in a difference with the total reported here.

All directors are covered by the terms of a civil liability policy arranged for directors and senior managers to cover any third-party liability they may incur while discharging their duties. The Remuneration Policy does not envisage any long-term savings systems for non-executive directors.



3.2 REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS DISCHARGING EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS

By way of summary, the remuneration mix corresponding to the remuneration envisaged for CaixaBank's Chief Executive Officer in 2025 is as follows:



FIXED COMPONENTS OF REMUNERATION

The Executive Directors' fixed remuneration is determined mostly by their level of responsibility and experience, combined with a market approach based on salary surveys and specific ad hoc studies. The salary surveys and specific ad hoc studies in which CaixaBank participates are conducted by top-level specialised companies. The reference sample for 2025 included a group of European financial institutions comparable to CaixaBank in terms of size (assets, market capitalisation, turnover and employees), business model and geographical location, as well as comparable IBEX 35 companies¹.

Peer group of European financial institutions

Santander	BBVA	Banco Sabadell	Bankinter	ABN Amro	Commerzbank
Societe General	Deutsche Bank	Erste Group	KBC Group	Lloyds Banking Group	ING Groep
NatWest	Standard Chartered	Swedbank	UniCredit		

In 2026, for the sample used in the assessment of CaixaBank's Chief Executive Officer and senior management, SwedBank has been replaced by Intesa SanPaolo, given that it is a better fit with the comparison criteria described above.

As a general rule, the fixed remuneration accrued by executive directors includes remuneration received in connection with duties carried out at CaixaBank Group entities or other entities in the interests of CaixaBank.

This remuneration is deducted from the net amount of fixed remuneration to be received. Furthermore, as a fixed component of remuneration, executive directors may have pre-agreed contributions to pension and savings schemes stipulated in their contracts. These contributions are detailed in the corresponding section, without prejudice to compliance with the applicable regulations on discretionary pension benefits.

¹ Includes all IBEX 35 companies except for AENA, as remuneration is limited under the regulations; Arcelomittal, as the Board of Directors is not located in Spain; and Solaria, as the executive directors are not remunerated for their executive function.



Accrued remuneration linked to fixed components for executive directors is presented below:

Remuneration linked to fixed components for executive directors

(thousands of €)	Position	Salary	Remuneration for board membership	Remuneration for membership on board committees	Remuneration for positions in Group companies	Remuneration for membership of boards outside the Group	Total fixed annual remuneration
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	2,103.8	110.0	60.0	308.7		2,582.5
Total per item 2025		2,103.8	110.0	60.0	308.7	0.0	2,582.5
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	2,260.7	97.3	54.1	95.1		2,507.2
José Ignacio Goirigolzarri	Executive Chairman	1,595.1	97.3	82.4		9.7	1,784.5
Total per item 2024		3,855.8	194.7	136.5	95.1	9.7	4,291.7

In addition, executive directors may receive remuneration in kind in the form of health insurance coverage for themselves and their immediate family members, use of a car or housing, or similar benefits customary in the sector, appropriate to their professional status and in line with the standards established for the professional segment to which they belong. The other accrued benefits for executive directors are set out below:

Other benefits for executive directors

(thousands of €)	Position	for themselves and their families*	Use of company car and housing	Others	Total
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	5		13	18
Total per item 2025		5		13	18
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	4		12	16
José Ignacio Goirigolzarri	Executive Chairman	3		3	6
Total per item 2024			7		15

Medical insurance for the Chief Executive Officer, spouse and children aged under 25.

VARIABLE COMPONENTS OF REMUNERATION

Variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics

From January 2022, the variable remuneration of executive directors, similar to the model applicable to the other members of the Group's Identified Staff, consists of a risk-adjusted variable remuneration scheme based on performance measurement that is awarded annually on the basis of annual metrics with a long-term adjustment through the establishment of multi-year metrics.


This scheme is determined on the basis of a target variable remuneration established for each of the executive directors by the Board of Directors, at the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, which represents the amount of variable remuneration to be received in the event of 100 % compliance with the established targets. In the case of over-achievement of the annual objectives, a maximum achievement rate of 120 % can be reached.

Annual factors, with quantitative corporate (financial) and qualitative corporate (non-financial) criteria, which must be specified and clearly documented, are used for performance measurement and for the evaluation of results. In addition, multi-year factors based on corporate criteria are also used, which adjust, as a reduction mechanism, the payment of the deferred portion subject to multi-year factors. This scheme is based solely on meeting corporate challenges, which are weighted at 100 %.

Under this system, the executive directors of the Bank will receive 40 % of the variable remuneration for the current financial year in equal parts in cash and CaixaBank shares, while the remaining 60 % will be deferred, 30 % in cash and 70 % in shares, over a period of five years. In this regard, the payment for the first two years of deferral is subject to annual factors, while the payment for the following three years will be subject to compliance with the approved multi-year factors.



Below is a graphical example of the vesting, consolidation and payout system of the variable remuneration of the executive directors for the 2025 variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics.



The receipt of variable remuneration with multi-year metrics by executive directors is subject to them maintaining their service relationship as at 31 December of the year in which such variable remuneration is to vest.

For financial year 2025, the Chief Executive Officer has been assigned an annual variable target remuneration equivalent to 55 % of his annual fixed components in the event of 100 % compliance with the targets set at the beginning of the year by the Board, which may reach up to a maximum of 66 % of the annual fixed components in the event of the maximum compliance of 120 %.

Position	Variable remuneration target (thousands of €)	Variable remuneration maximum 120 % (thousands of €)
Gonzalo Gortázar Chief Executive Officer	1,750	2,100

CORPORATE CHALLENGES FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS' VARIABLE REMUNERATION IN 2025

Annual factor measurement metrics

The corporate challenges, with a weighting of 100 %, are set annually by the Board on the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, subject to a degree of achievement [80 %-120 %], which is determined on the basis of the following concepts aligned with the strategic objectives:

Criteria	Metric	Weighting	Degree of compliance	Degree of achievement	Target	Result	Recognition of the target (%)			
Financial	ROTE	20%	> 18% = 120% Between 18 % and 13.6 % < 13.6% = 0%	120% Between 120% and 80% 0%	15.8%	17.5%	114.5%			
	Recurring Efficiency ratio	15%	< 39.4% = 120% Between 39.4 % and 42.7 % > 42.7% = 0%	120% Between 120% and 80% 0%	41.0%	39.4%	118.8%			
	NPAs (chg. in millions of €)	10%	< -€1,697 million € = 120% Between -€1,697 million and -€859 million € > -€859 million € = 0%	120% Between 120% and 80% 0%	-1,278 mill.€	-2,345 mill. €	120%			
	Market share	10%	>+0.42 pp Between +0.22 pp and +0.42 pp Between +0.02 pp and +0.22 pp Between - 0.18 pp and +0.02 pp < -0.18 pp	120% Between 100% and 120% 100% Between 80% and 100% 0%	+0.12 pp	+0.08 pp	100%			
Corporate	RAF	20%	0 ambers	105%	1 ámbar	1 ámbar	100%			
			0.5 ambers	103%						
			1 amber	100%						
			1.5 ambers	98%						
			2 ambers	95%						
			2.5 ambers	93%						
			3 ambers	90%						
			3.5 ambers	88%						
			4 ambers	85%						
			4.5 ambers	82.5%						
			5 ambers	80%						
Non-financial	Sustainability factors (environmental, social and governance)	10%	Cumulative mobilisation of sustainable finance (25 %)	> 40,713 million € Between €40,713 million and €27,142 million € < €27,142 million €	120% Between 120% and 80% 0%	€33,928 million €	€46,167 million €			
			% companies with credit exposure to sectors under the Net Zero perimeter at the end of 2024 with which engagement has been carried out (25 %)	Between 100 % and 80 % < 80% 0%	Between 120% and 80% 0%	90.0%	93.9%	117.0%		
			Above-average recognition among two to four of the leading sustainability ratings agencies (MSCI, S&P, Sustainalytics, Fitch, ISS) relative to peers in the Eurostoxx Banks (25%)	In more than 4 rating agencies Between 4 and 2 agencies In less than 2 rating agencies	120% Between 120% and 80% 0%	3 out of 5	5 out of 5			
			% Women in management positions (25 %)	> 44% Between 44 % and 43.8 %	120% Between 120% and 80%	43.9%	44.0%			
			Quality	15%	Relational NPS (60 %)	< 43,8% > 25% Between 17 % and 25 %	0% 120% Between 120% and 80%	21.0%	20.80%	
					Transactional NPS (40 %)	< 17% > 70% Between 64 % and 70 %	0% 120% Between 120% and 80%	67.0%	67.9%	101.8%
						< 64%	0%			
Achievement							109.69%			
A negative adjustment of 5 % is included in the event that a certain number of High and Medium criticality compliance GAPs older than 6 and 12 months, respectively, are exceeded at year-end 2025.							No adjustment applicable			

The established metrics and targets pursued with each of them are described in detail below:

FINANCIAL CORPORATE CRITERIA:

ROTE (Return on Tangible Equity) (20 %)

Definition: Measures the profitability index of the tangible assets and is calculated as the Profit/(loss) attributable to the Group (adjusted by the amount of the Additional Tier 1 coupon) and net equity plus valuation adjustments for the last 12 months, minus the intangible assets such as goodwill. The degree of compliance with the ROTE in 2025 has been calculated as follows: 5,613 (result net of ATI coupon) / 32,153 (own funds and average valuation adjustments net of intangibles).

The target for the challenge was 15.8 %, and a result of 17.5 % was achieved, which means a recognition rate in 2025 of 114.5 %.

Recurring efficiency ratio (CER) (15 %)

Definition: This represents the weight of recurring expenses in relation to the bank's gross income. It is calculated as the percentage ratio of the Group's recurring expenses to the gross income.

The degree of compliance with the efficiency ratio in 2025 has been calculated as follows: 6,427 (recurring expenses) / 15,667 (gross income).

The target for the challenge was 41 %, and a result of 39.4 % has been achieved, which means a degree of achievement of the challenge in the year 2025 of 118,8 %.

NPA variation (10 %)

Definition: This is the change, in absolute terms, in the Group's problematic assets (defined as non-performing and foreclosed loans and auction rights).

The degree of compliance with this metric in 2025 has been calculated as follows: the target for the challenge was a variation of -€1,278 million, and a result of -€2,345 million was achieved, meaning the degree of achievement of the challenge in 2025 is the maximum of 120 %.

Market share (10 %)

Definition: This metric measures the variation in overall market share, including credit and funds from the non-financial private sector in Spain.

For its measurement, the average market share from September to November 2025 is compared with the average market share from September to November 2024. The resulting variation of +0.08 percentage points implies a degree of achievement of this challenge of 100 %, as the range set for this degree of achievement was between +0.02 and +0.22 percentage points.

NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATE CRITERIA:

Risk Appetite Framework (RAF): (20%)

Definition: To calculate the fulfilment of the objective related to the RAF metric, an aggregation of the tier 1 metrics scorecard of the Company's Risk Appetite Framework is used. This scorecard consists of quantitative metrics that measure the different types of risk, for which the Board of Directors establishes areas of appetite (green), tolerance (amber) or non-compliance (red), and determines the scale of fulfilment that establishes penalty or bonus percentages according to the variation of each metric, between the actual situation at the end of the year and that initially forecast for the same year in the budget.

For 2025, the set objective did not allow exceeding 100 % achievement, given the starting point and budget, where all metrics were initially in green. The final number of amber indicators for the metrics was 1, which was the budgeted target, meaning that, based on the compliance scale, 100% fulfilment was achieved in 2025.

The RAF scorecard enables the monitoring of financial, non-financial, and cross-cutting risks. In particular, it includes risks such as operational risk, conduct risk and reputational risk. The scope of these metrics covers the entire CaixaBank Group. From a reputational perspective, the scorecard directly considers sustainability-related aspects, as well as those linked to cybersecurity, data protection and customer experience. These aspects, in turn, are the ones that emerge as material in the Double Materiality Study 2025.



Sustainability (10 %)

Definition: Synthetic metric that encompassed four different indicators (mobilisation of sustainable finance, engagement with companies under the Net Zero perimeter, position in main ESG ratings and % of female directors), each with a weight of 25%.

The calculation of sustainable finance mobilised (not considering the market effect in the figure for the increase of sustainable assets under management) is determined on a straight line basis between the result achieved of €46,167 million and the challenge set in line with the sustainability plan for 2025, which was €33,928 million, making for a 120 % achievement rate.

This challenge is directly related to the commitment assumed in the Strategic Plan to become a European leader in Sustainability and is linked to the material sub-theme of "Offer of products and services with ESG characteristics" included in the Double Materiality Study 2025.

As regards the percentage of companies under the Net Zero perimeter with which engagement has been performed during the year to align borrowers with the commitments acquired by the Bank, the achievement level was 93.9 %, which compared to the original target of 90 %, making for an achievement rate of 107.8 %.

In the challenge concerning the recognition of the main sustainability ratings, above the average of the peers included in the Euro Stoxx Banks index, the Bank placed above average in five of the five ratings considered, representing an achievement rate of 120 %.

The result of the challenge for the percentage of women in management positions was 44 %, which compared to the challenge of 43.9 %, represents an achievement rate of 120 %.

This challenge features in the Double Materiality Study 2025 and is linked to the material subtopic "Diversity, Equity and Inclusion".

Consequently, the final achievement of the weighted synthetic challenge is 117%.

Quality (15 %)

Definition: This metric combines the Net Promoter Score index (customers who recommend us) from different areas of the organisation. 60% based on the Relational NPS and 40% based on a synthetic Transactional NPS, which measures satisfaction after interacting with the Bank's different channels.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE CHALLENGE WAS:

- | Relational NPS: 21%
- | Transactional NPS: 67%

HAVING REACHED A RESULT OF:

- | Relational NPS: 20,8%
- | Transactional NPS: 67,9%

Therefore, the degree of achievement of the challenge in 2025 is 101.8 %.

This challenge is related to material subtopic "Value proposition, responsible marketing and customer satisfaction" included in the 2025 Double Materiality Assessment, and reflects CaixaBank's commitment to maintain an efficient customer service model adapted to customer preferences, measuring quality by specific segments, pursuing the financial inclusion of all of society, as set out in our 2025-2027 Strategic Plan.

Compliance (Adjustment of 5 %)

Definition: The adjustment is determined based on high- and medium-risk regulatory compliance GAPS identified by the Compliance department. A penalty of up to 5 % of the total variable remuneration granted will be applied depending on the number of GAPS and the timeframe for resolution.

Considering the number of high- and medium-criticality GAPS that have remained unresolved for more than 6 and 12 months as of the end of the 2025



CORPORATE CHALLENGES FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS' VARIABLE REMUNERATION (2023-2025 ADJUSTMENTS) OF THE 2023 VR SCHEME

Multi-year factor measurement metrics

The multi-year corporate challenges, with a 100 % weighting, are set annually by the Board, based on a proposal from the Remuneration Committee, with an achievement range of [0 %-100 %]. These targets serve as a potential reduction adjustment to deferred variable remuneration. The determination of the 2023-2025 multi-year challenge is based on the following concepts aligned with strategic objectives:

Criteria	Metric	Weighting	Target Value	Degree of compliance	Degree of penalty	Result	Penalty
Corporate	CET1	25%	RAF measure for risk tolerance in green	Red = 0 %	100%	Green	0%
				Amber = 50 %	50%		
				Green = 100 %	0%		
	TSR	25%	Value of the Euro Stoxx Banks index – Gross Return index	>= index = 100 %	0%	28,3 points above the index	0%
			<index = 0 %	100%			
	Multi-year ROTE	25%	Average of amounts challenged annually over the measurement period	>Average = 100 %	0%	116%	0%
			Between 80 % and 100 %	Between 0 and 100%			
			< 80% = 0%	100%			
	Sustainability	25%	€ 66,961 million	> = € 66,961 million = 100%	0%	€ 105,611 million	0%
			Between €50,221 million and €66,961 million = between 75 % and 100 %	Between 0 and 100%			
			< € 50,221 million = 0%	100%			

Based on the above results, the Board of Directors, upon proposal of the Remuneration Committee, has approved a 0% adjustment of the portion of variable remuneration linked to multi-year measurement factors.

As a result, no multi-year factor adjustment applies to payments scheduled for 2027, 2028 and 2029 under the 2023 variable remuneration scheme for the Chief Executive Officer, without prejudice to the remaining conditions of the system for granting, vesting and payment of executive directors' variable remuneration, as stipulated in the Remuneration Policy.

The metrics associated with the multi-year factors are described below:

CETI (25 %)

Definition: Metrics linked to the colour (tolerance level) of the indicator in the CETI RAF at the end of the multi-year period.

Total shareholder return (TSR) (25 %)

Definition: Comparison of the performance of CaixaBank's TSR in relation to the performance of the TSR of the Euro Stoxx Banks index – Gross Return (SX7GT) during the period considered.

Multi-year ROTE (25 %)

Definition: Set as the average achievement of the ROTE challenge for each of the years of the multi-year measurement period.

Sustainability (25 %)

Definition: The amount mobilised resulting from the sum of sustainable financing for individuals, businesses, and Corporate International Banking (including MicroBank), and sustainable brokerage in channelling third-party resources toward sustainable investments (proportional participation in the placement of green, social, and/or sustainable bonds and the growth in the assets under management in sustainable products under the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR)).

The aforementioned metrics are linked to achievement scales. If the targets set for each metric are not met within the three-year measurement period, they may reduce the deferred portion of variable remuneration still pending payment, but they can never increase it.



DETERMINATION OF VARIABLE REMUNERATION WITH MULTI-YEAR METRICS

The final determination of the variable remuneration entitlement in the form of a bonus must be approved by the Board, based on a proposal from the Remuneration Committee.

Following the evaluation of all previous objectives, the Board of Directors has reached the following conclusions:

% ACHIEVEMENT OF CHALLENGES FOR THE PURPOSE OF GRANTING VARIABLE REMUNERATION IN THE FORM OF A BONUS

_CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Variable remuneration with multi-year metrics – 2025 target (thousands of €)	% achievement of corporate challenges	Variable remuneration with multi-year metrics – 2025 (thousands of €)
1,750	109.69%	1,920

Variable remuneration in the form of a bonus accrued by the Chief Executive Officer, approved by the Board of Directors, based on a proposal from the Remuneration Committee, stood at €1,919,575 in the financial year 2025, equivalent to 60.3 % of total annual fixed components and 37 % of his total remuneration.

Variable remuneration 2025	% accumulated settlement of variable remuneration in bonus format per financial year	Settlement instrument	% of variable remuneration in bonus format for the relevant financial year	Equivalent gross number of shares	Equivalent remuneration (thousands of €)
Initial portion	40%	Shares	20%	36,095	384
		Cash	20%		384
Deferred remuneration	24%	Shares	17%	30,321	322
		Cash	7%		138
Subject to Multi-Year Factors	36%	Shares	25%	45,480	484
		Cash	11%		207



DEFERRAL AND PAYMENT IN VARIABLE REMUNERATION INSTRUMENTS

_GONZALO GORTÁZAR – CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Variable remuneration components accrued in 2025 by the Chief Executive Officer:

Variable remuneration*	Settlement instrument	% of variable remuneration under the LTI format for the year in question	Equivalent gross number of shares	% accumulated settlement of variable remuneration under the LTI format for each year	Equivalent remuneration at the grant date (thousands of €)¹	Unrealised deferred remuneration (thousands of €)
Payment of upfront variable remuneration for 2025	Shares	20%	36,095	40%	384	1,152
	Cash	20%			384	
Payment of deferred variable remuneration for 2024	Shares	8%	19,709	52%	110	631
	Cash	4%			47	
Payment of deferred variable remuneration for 2023	Shares	8%	24,428	64%	95	409
	Cash	4%			41	
Payment of deferred variable remuneration for 2022	Shares	8%	23,374	76%	91	261
	Cash	4%			39	
Payment of deferred variable remuneration for the 2021 bonus	Shares	6%	18,140	88%	50	99
	Cash	6%			50	

* In 2020, the Chief Executive Officer voluntarily waived the annual variable remuneration in the form of a bonus for that year as an act of responsibility for the exceptional economic and social situation generated by COVID-19.

Interest and returns on deferred variable remuneration accrued in the year by the Chief Executive Officer in the form of a bonus amounted to €13,454 and are included under “Other items” in point 7.C.1. a) i) in the statistical annex.

¹ Given that, at the date of authorisation for issue of this report, the shares indicated had not been delivered to their beneficiaries, for the purposes of calculating their cash value and complying with the statistical annex, the same average price used to calculate the share portion of the variable remuneration 2025 was used, which corresponds to the average closing price of CaixaBank shares on the stock market sessions running from 1 to 31 January 2026, which was €10.636/share.

LONG-TERM VARIABLE COMPONENTS OF THE REMUNERATION SYSTEMS FROM PRIOR YEARS

CONDITIONAL ANNUAL INCENTIVES PLAN LINKED TO THE 2019-2021 STRATEGIC PLAN

On 5 April 2019, the Annual General Meeting approved the implementation of a Conditional Annual Incentives Plan (“CAIP”) linked to the 2019-2021 Strategic Plan, whereby eligible subjects may receive a number of CaixaBank shares once a certain period of time has elapsed and provided the strategic objectives and a set of specific requirements are met.

The CAIP involved the allocation of units in 2019, 2020, and 2021 to each beneficiary, serving as the basis for determining the number of CaixaBank shares to be delivered once the final number of units was determined based on the annual performance objectives of the first measurement period (annual) and the adjustment made during the second measurement period (3 years) of each cycle.


Regarding the second cycle of the plan, as a responsibility measure by CaixaBank Management due to the exceptional economic and social situation caused by COVID-19, the Board of Directors approved, in its session on 16 April 2020, the non-allocation of shares to beneficiaries of the second cycle of the plan.

All relevant information regarding the determination and achievement of the first and third cycles of the CAIP can be found in the 2023 ARRD and previous reports.

The remuneration accrued in 2025 linked to the third CAIP cycle for the Chief Executive Officer is broken down below:

_GONZALO GORTÁZAR – CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Long-term variable components of remuneration	Settlement instrument	% of variable remuneration under the LTI for the year in question	Gross number of shares	% accumulated of variable remuneration under the LTI for each year	Unrealised deferred remuneration in gross shares
Payment of 3 rd CAIP cycle 2019-2021	Shares	33%	35,568	67%	35,568



COMMON REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO VARIABLE REMUNERATION

RETENTION POLICY

The instruments delivered are subject to a three-year retention period, during which time they may not be disposed of by the Director.

However, one year after the delivery of the instruments, the Director may dispose of the instruments if he/she maintains, after the disposal or exercise, a net economic exposure to the change in the price of the instruments for a market value equivalent to an amount of at least twice his/her annual fixed remuneration through the ownership of shares, options, rights to deliver shares or other financial instruments reflecting the market value of CaixaBank.

In addition, after the first year of holding, the Director may dispose of the instruments to the extent necessary to meet the costs related to their acquisition or, subject to the favourable opinion of the Remuneration Committee, to meet any extraordinary situations that may arise.

During the retention period, the exercise of the rights conferred by the instruments is vested in the Director as the holder of the instruments.



SITUATIONS IN WHICH VARIABLE REMUNERATION MAY BE REDUCED (MALUS)

The amounts of variable remuneration paid to executive directors shall be totally or partially reduced, including the amounts pending payment, whether cash or share-based payments, in the event of a poor financial performance by CaixaBank overall or by one of its divisions or areas, or because of any material exposure generated. In this regard, CaixaBank must compare the assessed performance with the subsequent performance of the variables that helped meet the targets. The assumptions that may give rise to the reduction of variable remuneration are as follows:

- | Material failures in risk management committed (such as serious breaches in the RAF, as ruled by the Global Risks Committee) by CaixaBank, or by a business unit or risk control unit, including the existence of qualified opinions in the external auditor's report or other circumstances that have the effect of impairing the financial parameters used to calculate the variable remuneration.
- | An increase in capital requirements for CaixaBank or one of its business units that was not envisaged at the time the exposure was generated.
- | Regulatory sanctions or adverse legal rulings attributable to the unit or the employee responsible for those proceedings and to the executive director.
- | Non-compliance with internal regulations or codes of conduct within the Group, including:
 - a. Serious or very serious breaches of regulations attributable to them.
 - b. Serious or very serious breaches of internal regulations.
 - c. Breach of the applicable suitability and behavioural requirements.
 - d. Regulatory breaches attributable to them which, whether or not involving losses, could jeopardise the solvency of a line of business and, in general, participation in or responsibility for conduct that has generated significant losses.
- | Improper conduct, whether committed individually or with others, with specific consideration of the adverse effects of the sale of unsuitable products and the responsibility of executive directors in taking such decisions.
- | Fair disciplinary dismissal or, in the case of business contracts, with just cause by the Company (in this case a full deduction shall be made). Just cause shall be understood as any serious and culpable breach of the duties of loyalty, diligence and good faith pursuant to which the executive directors must discharge their duties at the Group, as well as any other serious and culpable breach of the obligations assumed under their contract, or any other organic or service-based relationship between the individual concerned and the Group.

- | When payment or vesting of the remuneration is not sustainable given CaixaBank's overall financial situation, or not justified in light of its results of the business unit or director.
- | Any other situation or circumstance that may be expressly included in the contract or imposed by applicable law and regulations.
- | Variable remuneration shall be reduced if, at the time of the performance assessment, CaixaBank is subject to any requirement or recommendation issued by a competent authority to restrict its dividend distribution policy, or if this is required by the competent authority under its regulatory powers.



SITUATIONS WARRANTING RECOVERY OF VARIABLE REMUNERATION (CLAWBACK)

- | If any of the above situations occurred prior to payment of any amount of variable remuneration but comes to light after payment has been made, and if it that situation would have led to the non-payment or all or part of that remuneration had it been known, then the executive director must repay CaixaBank the part of the variable remuneration that was unduly received, along with any interest or return the director may have earned on that undue payment.
- | Situations in which the executive director made a major contribution to poor financial results or losses will be treated as being particularly serious, as shall cases of fraud or other instances of wilful misconduct or gross negligence leading to significant losses.

The Remuneration Committee shall advise the Board of Directors on whether to reduce or abolish the director's right to receive deferred amounts, or whether to insist on the full or partial clawback of those amounts, depending on the circumstances of each case. Situations involving a reduction in variable remuneration will apply over the entire deferral period for that variable remuneration. Meanwhile, situations involving the clawback of variable remuneration will apply over the whole deferral and retention period for the variable remuneration, except where there has been wilful misconduct or gross negligence, in which case applicable law and regulations governing prescription periods will apply.

TERMINATION OR SUSPENSION OF PROFESSIONAL RELATIONS

Termination or suspension of professional relations, and departures due to invalidity, early retirement, retirement or partial retirement shall not interrupt the payment cycle of variable remuneration, notwithstanding the provision made for deductions and recovery of variable remuneration. In the event of the director's death, the People Division and the General Risks Division shall work together to determine and, as the case may be, propose a suitable calculation and payment process for pending payment cycles under criteria compatible with the general principles contained in the LOSS, its implementing regulations and CaixaBank's own Remuneration Policy.

SPECIAL SITUATIONS

In unforeseen special situations (i.e. corporate transactions affecting the ownership of the instruments delivered or deferred), specific solutions must be applied in line with the LOSS and the principles of the Remuneration Policy, so that the value of the consideration to which such situations relate is not artificially diluted or altered.

INCOMPATIBILITY WITH PERSONAL HEDGING STRATEGIES OR AVOIDANCE MECHANISMS.

Executive directors undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or insurance policies linked to their remuneration that would undermine the alignment with sound risk management, which their remuneration systems are designed to promote. Furthermore, CaixaBank will not grant variable remuneration through instruments or methods intended to, or effectively resulting in, non-compliance with the applicable executive directors' remuneration requirements.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO PENSION SCHEMES AND OTHER BENEFITS

Executive Directors may be entitled, as part of their normal remuneration package, to a supplementary pension scheme in addition to the ordinary employee scheme. If they hold a commercial contract, they may be eligible for specific pension schemes equivalent to the complementary pension scheme.

The commitments assumed with the executive directors can be of a contribution defined for the cases of retirement, disability and death, and additionally coverage for service can be defined for the cases of disability and death. These commitments will be instrumented through an insurance contract.

NON-DISCRETIONARY CHARACTER

With the exception of the mandatory variable-base contributions, the benefit or contribution system for the pension scheme does not qualify as a discretionary benefit system. It must be applied to the person, meaning that the individual will be eligible upon becoming an executive director or otherwise qualifying for a change in their remuneration, whether as a lump sum or an amount linked to their fixed remuneration, depending on the terms of their contract.

The amount of the contributions or the degree of coverage of the benefits: (i) must be pre-defined at the start of the year and clearly set out in the

contract; (ii) may not originate from variable parameters; (iii) may not take the form of extraordinary contributions (e.g., bonuses, awards or extraordinary contributions made in the years leading up to retirement or departure); and (iv) must not be related to substantial changes in the terms of retirement (including any changes arising from merger processes or business combinations).

ELIMINATION OF DUPLICITIES

The contributions paid to pension schemes shall be less the amount of any contributions made under equivalent instruments or policies that may be established as a result of positions held at Group companies or at other companies on CaixaBank's behalf. This procedure must also be applied for provisions that must be adjusted to avoid overlap or duplication.

RIGHTS CONSOLIDATION SCHEME

If applicable, executive directors will retain their economic rights over the pension scheme in the event of termination or cessation of the professional relationship before the covered contingencies occur, unless such termination is due to just cause, as applicable, or for other specific reasons outlined in their contracts. No payments are planned at the effective date of termination or cessation of the professional relationship.

MANDATORY CONTRIBUTIONS FOR VARIABLE REMUNERATION

15 % of the contributions paid to complementary pension schemes will be considered an on-target amount (while the remaining 85 % is treated as a fixed component). This amount is determined following the same principles and procedures established for the award of remuneration based on annual factors within the variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics and is allocated to a Discretionary Pension Benefits policy.

The contribution shall be considered deferred variable remuneration. Accordingly, the Discretionary Benefits Pension Policy shall contain clauses ensuring that the contribution is explicitly subject to the same malus and clawback clauses described above for variable remuneration with multi-year metrics. It shall also count towards the relevant limits on the total amount of variable remuneration.

If the executive director leaves the Bank to take up retirement or leaves prematurely for any other reason, the discretionary pension benefits shall be subject to a lock-up period of five years from the date on which the director ceases to provide services at the Bank. During the lock-up period, the Bank shall apply the same requirements in relation to the malus and clawback clauses described above.

The following table shows the accrued remuneration of executive directors in 2025 through long-term savings systems:

REMUNERATION THROUGH LONG-TERM SAVINGS SCHEMES FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

Long-term savings system (defined contribution)

	Position	Fixed component (85%) (thousands of €)	Variable component (15%) (thousands of €)	Coverage for death, permanent disability and severe invalidity (thousands of €)	Total (thousands of €)	
	Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	471	92	111	674
Total per item 2025			471	92	111	674
	Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	471	99	98	668
	José Ignacio Goirigolzarri	Executive Chairman			128	128
Total per item 2024			471	99	226	796

The following table shows contributions in the form of variable remuneration made to the pension system of the Chief Executive Officer during the year now ended.

Target contribution to the pension system for the 2025 financial year (thousands of €)	Variable-based contribution (15%) (thousands of €)	Annual corporate challenge results 2024	Contributions to the pension system based on variable remuneration for the 2025 financial year (thousands of €)
554	83	110.25%	92



REMUNERATIONS TO BOARD MEMBERS AS CONSIDERATION FOR REPRESENTING CAIXABANK

In accordance with the remuneration amounts currently set for the respective companies, which are included within the Total Fixed Annual Remuneration of Directors, the payments related to Directors' roles within the Group or in other companies in the interest of CaixaBank are as follows:

_REMUNERATION FOR POSITIONS IN GROUP COMPANIES AND OTHER COMPANIES ON BEHALF OF CAIXABANK

(thousands of €)	Position	Investee	Total
Gonzalo Gortázar	Director	Banco BPI, S.A.	63
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chairman	CaixaBank Payments & Consumer	32
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chairman	VidaCaixa	214
Tomás Muniesa	Chairman	ECSC	17
Pablo Forero	Chairman	CaixaBank Asset Management, S.G.I.I.C., SAU ¹	45
Total per item 2025			371

REMUNERATION OF BOARD MEMBERS OUTSIDE THEIR ROLE AS DIRECTOR

Fernando Maria Ulrich Costa Duarte is non-executive Chairman of the Board of Directors of Banco BPI. The remuneration received for his membership on this Board amounts to 750,000 euros.



¹ On 24 July 2025, Mr Pablo Forero resigned as a member and Chairman of the Board of Directors.

04. Terms and conditions of general contracts and of those of the Chief Executive Officer

4.1 GENERAL CONTRACT CONDITIONS

Type of contract: The type of contract will be determined by the level of management functions performed beyond the mere role of director, in accordance with, among others, the doctrine of the Supreme Court regarding the so-called "link theory".

Term: In general, contracts shall be drawn up for an indefinite term.

Description of functions, dedication, exclusivity and incompatibilities: The contract shall provide a clear description of the duties and responsibilities to be undertaken and the functional location of the subject and to whom he or she reports within the organisational and governance structure of CaixaBank. It must likewise stipulate the duty of exclusive dedication to the Group, without prejudice to other authorised activities in the interests of the CaixaBank Group or occasional teaching activities and participation in conferences or responsibilities at own or family-run businesses, provided these activities do not prevent the director from discharging their duties diligently and loyally at CaixaBank and do not pose a conflict of interest with the Company.

Executive directors will be subject to the legal system governing incompatibilities from serving as director.

Other continuity conditions which are in CaixaBank's best interests may also be agreed in the contracts.

Compliance with duties and obligation of confidentiality: The contract shall contain certain obligations requiring the director to discharge the duties inherent to the role of director, as well as non-disclosure obligations in respect of the information to which the director becomes privy while holding office.

Coverage of civil liability and compensation: Executive directors and all other directors are named as the insured parties under the civil liability insurance policy taken out for Group directors and managers.

Likewise, the contracts may state that CaixaBank shall hold executive directors harmless of any losses or damages arising from claims by third parties, unless the executive directors have acted negligently or with wilful deceit.



Post-contractual non-compete agreements: The contracts will include post-contractual non-compete obligations in relation to financial activities, to remain binding and in effect for no less than one year following the termination of the contract. Unless otherwise justified, consideration for non-compete undertakings shall be set as the sum of all fixed components of remuneration that the executive director received over the term of that undertaking. The amount of the consideration will be divided into equal instalments and paid at regular intervals over the non-compete period.

Breach of the post-contractual non-compete undertaking will entitle CaixaBank to seek and obtain compensation from the executive director for a proportional amount of the consideration effectively paid.

Early termination clauses: Contracts shall set out the situations in which executive directors may terminate their contract with the right to compensation. These may include breach of contract on the part of CaixaBank, wrongful or unfair dismissal or a change of control at the Company.

Likewise, the contracts must recognise CaixaBank's right to terminate the contract in the event of breach by the executive director, in which case no compensation will be payable to the director.

In any case of contract termination, CaixaBank reserves the right to require executive directors to resign from any positions or functions held in companies in the interest of CaixaBank.

Contracts shall provide for a notice period of at least three months and adequate compensation in case of non-compliance, proportionate to the fixed remuneration accrued during the unfulfilled periods.

The amount of compensation payable for contract termination will be established at all times such that it does not exceed legal limits on the maximum ratio of variable remuneration, as per EBA criteria. Payments for early termination must be based on the results secured over time, and must not compensate poor results or undue conduct.

The payment of early termination compensation that is considered variable remuneration will be deferred and paid in accordance with the provisions for variable remuneration and will be subject to the same reduction and clawback conditions as described.

Payments for cancellation of previous contracts:

Where remuneration packages relating to compensation for departure from previous contracts are agreed to, these should be tailored to the long-term interests of the Bank by applying the limits and requirements set out in the LOSS and the EBA Guidelines, with pay cycle provisions similar to those set out in the Remuneration Policy for variable remuneration.

Other contract conditions: The contracts may contain standard contractual clauses compatible with the Act on the Organisation, Supervision and Solvency of Credit Institutions, the Capital Enterprises Act, other applicable law and regulations and the Remuneration Policy.



4.2 SPECIAL TERMS OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER'S CONTRACT

Appointment	Special terms of the Chief Executive Officer's contract
Type of contract	Commercial contract
Term	Indefinite-term contract
Description of functions, dedication, exclusivity and incompatibilities	The contract shall provide a clear description of the duties and responsibilities and of the obligation to work exclusively for CaixaBank. It contains no permanency conditions and includes provisions to ensure that the contract is consistent with the Remuneration Policy.
Compliance with duties and confidentiality obligation	It also contains clauses regarding compliance with duties, confidentiality and liability coverage.
Coverage of civil liability and compensation	Executive directors and all other directors are named as the insured parties under the civil liability insurance policy taken out for Group directors and managers
Post-contractual non-compete undertakings	<p>The contract contains a post-contractual non-compete undertakings of one year from termination, which encompasses any direct or indirect activity within the financial sector. The amount for the non-compete agreement is established as one year of the fixed components of his remuneration, and it shall be reduced by any sums received from Companies in the Group or at which he represents CaixaBank by way of compensation for post-contractual non-compete obligations. This compensation shall be paid in 12 equal monthly instalments, the first of which shall be payable at the end of the calendar month in which the director's service contract terminates. If the Chief Executive Officer breaches his post-contractual non-compete undertaking, he shall pay CaixaBank an amount equivalent to one year of his fixed remuneration.</p>
Early termination clauses	<p>Aside from the compensation payable under the non-compete clause, the Chief Executive Officer will be entitled to receive compensation amounting to one year of the fixed components of his remuneration if his services contract is terminated for any of the following reasons:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) unilateral termination by the Chief Executive Officer due to a serious breach by the Company of the obligations set out in the services contract; (ii) unilateral termination by the Company without just cause; (iii) removal from or non-renewal of his position as Board member and of his duties as Chief Executive Officer without just cause; or (iv) acquisition of a controlling stake in the Company by an entity other than "la Caixa" Banking Foundation, or the transfer of all or a relevant part of the Company's business activities or assets and liabilities to a third party, or its integration within another business group that obtains control of the Company. <p>The resulting amount of compensation must be paid in accordance with the law and the terms of the Remuneration Policy and shall also be reduced by any amounts of compensation received from the companies described in the preceding paragraph.</p> <p>To be eligible for the compensation, the Chief Executive Officer must simultaneously stand down from all posts of director or representative at other Group companies where he is representing the Company and at any external companies at which he may be acting on CaixaBank's behalf.</p> <p>Meanwhile, the Company may remove the Chief Executive Officer from his post and terminate his services contract with just cause in the following situations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (i) any serious and culpable breach of the duties of loyalty, diligence and good faith under which the Chief Executive Officer is bound to discharge his duties at the Group; (ii) where the Chief Executive Officer becomes unfit to hold office as such for reasons attributable to himself; or (iii) any other serious and culpable breach of the obligations assumed under the services contract, or any other organic or service-based relationship that may be established between the Chief Executive Officer and the respective entities at which he represents CaixaBank. <p>If the services contract is terminated with just cause or voluntarily by the Chief Executive Officer for reasons other than those just described, he will not be entitled to the compensation described previously.</p> <p>In the case of voluntary resignation, at least three months' notice must be given. In the event of non-compliance, the executive director will be required to pay the Bank the amount corresponding to the fixed components of remuneration for the remaining period of the applicable term.</p>
Other terms of contract	The contract also contains provisions to ensure that it is consistent with the Remuneration Policy.

05. Director Remuneration Policy for 2026



The Annual General Meeting of Shareholders held on 11 April 2025 approved the Remuneration Policy for the financial years 2025 to 2028, inclusive.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Board considers it necessary to amend the Policy, to be approved at the General Meeting of Shareholders on 27 March 2026.

Main changes to the Policy approved

The main changes to the Board Remuneration Policy are due to the updating of the economic conditions of the directors for their non-executive functions, as well as the different components of the Chief Executive Officer's remuneration.

- a. Update of directors' remuneration for their non-executive functions, as well as the proposed maximum overall remuneration amount, which is increased by 3 %. The average increase in remuneration is 3.32 %.
- b. Updating of the fixed and variable components of the Chief Executive Officer's remuneration. The increase is 3 % for fixed remuneration and contributions to savings plans and 49.7 % for the target variable remuneration. The overall increase is 19.7 %.
- c. Other minor adjustments and improvements in drafting accuracy are introduced which do not alter the meaning of the previous version of the Policy.

This proposal maintains a competitive remuneration system aimed at attracting, retaining and building loyalty among talented candidates for board positions with a view to guaranteeing that the high suitability requirements pursued by CaixaBank and required by sectoral legislation for credit institutions continue to be adequately met.



5.1 REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS IN THEIR CAPACITY AS SUCH

The remuneration of members of the Board of Directors in their capacity as such consists solely of a fixed annual amount, the maximum figure of which is determined by the General Meeting of Shareholders and remains in force unless modified by the general meeting.

The amount established by the General Meeting of Shareholders shall be used to remunerate the Board of Directors and its committees and shall be distributed among members, as the Board sees fit, based on a recommendation from the Remuneration Committee. In apportioning the remuneration, the Board shall pay due regard to the duties and dedication of each member and any seats they occupy on the various committees. It shall also determine the frequency and method of payment, whether through bylaw-stipulated remuneration or others.

REMUNERATION OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS FOR THE EXERCISE OF HIS OFFICE

The remuneration accrued by the Chairman of the Board of Directors for the exercise of his office is justified given the special dedication expected of him in faithfully discharging his duties at such a large and complex a group as CaixaBank.

The Chairman is ultimately responsible for the smooth operating and running of the Board. In doing so, he shall call and chair Board meetings, set the agenda and steer discussions and debates. He shall also ensure that directors receive sufficient information ahead of Board meetings to enable them to discuss the agenda and shall endeavour to stimulate debate and the active involvement of all directors at meetings while safeguarding their right to form their own opinion and stance. The Chair of the CaixaBank Board also chairs CaixaBank's General Meeting of Shareholders.

In addition, without prejudice to the powers vested in the Chief Executive Officer and other authorisations and delegated powers, the Chair shall represent CaixaBank and its Group entities at the institutional level; act on behalf of the Company before sector organisations, sign on behalf of the Company any agreements that are necessary for legal or statutory reasons, contracts, accords or other legal instruments with public bodies and other entities; and act as the official representative of the Company vis-à-vis authorities, entities and third-party Spanish or foreign bodies. While, from a qualitative standpoint, the duties described above cannot be considered executive given their organic or

representative nature, from a quantitative standpoint, they entail a high degree of exclusive dedication to the Company of an intensity that is higher than that required of non-executive directors. Furthermore, given the size and complexity of CaixaBank and considering the idiosyncrasies in governance and other models and structures of the various entities, the non-executive functions of CaixaBank's Chair and the demands that these functions entail are not generally comparable to those of most of the entities comprising the benchmark group whose chairs have a non-executive function.

To this end, the updated remuneration proposed for the Chairman (€1,485,000) represents an increase of 3 % compared to 2025, which maintains the level of real remuneration, offsetting the effect of inflation.

REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS

Concerning directors' remuneration, the proposed increases in remuneration for their status as directors and for serving on Board committees also respond to the desire to maintain their real remuneration, offsetting inflation, while placing remuneration in line with the average of IBEX 35 companies and remaining below the average of IBEX 35 financial entities. The sample used for the comparison, carried out by the Bank together with Ernst & Young, is the same group of IBEX 35 companies and national and European banks used for the executive director benchmark, which is detailed in point 3 of this report.

The increases vary slightly depending on the committees, but generate an average increase in total remuneration of 3.43 %¹, maintaining the level of actual remuneration.

In view of the foregoing, the maximum remuneration amount for all directors, without taking into account the remuneration for executive functions proposed for approval at the General Meeting of Shareholders of 27 March 2026, which will remain unchanged in subsequent years until the general meeting decides on a new figure and which will be applicable as from 1 January 2026, amounts to €5,150,000 (increase of 3 %) and its distribution may give rise to different remuneration for each of the directors. The proposed amounts for the current financial year are detailed below:

¹ The increase in fixed remuneration for CaixaBank's workforce will be more than 4 % in 2026, comprising the 3 % increase established in the collective bargaining agreement plus the increases due to labour agreements.

_REMUNERATION FOR MEMBERSHIP OF THE BOARD AND BOARD COMMITTEES

(thousands of €)	Total 2026	Total 2025
Base remuneration of each Board member	114	110
Remuneration of the Chairman of the Board of Directors (includes base remuneration for acting as a member of Board)	1,599	1,551
Remuneration of the Lead Independent Director (includes base remuneration for acting as a member of Board)	159	153
Remuneration of each member of the Executive Committee	62	60
Remuneration of the Chair of the Executive Committee	93	90
Remuneration of each member of the Risks Committee	62	60
Remuneration of the Chair of the Risks Committee	93	90
Remuneration of each member of the Audit and Control Committee	62	60
Remuneration of the Chair of the Audit and Control Committee	93	90
Remuneration of each member of the Appointments and Sustainability Committee	44	42
Remuneration of the Chair of the Appointments and Sustainability Committee	65	63
Remuneration of each member of the Remuneration Committee	37	36
Remuneration of the Chair of the Remuneration Committee	56	54
Remuneration of each member of the Innovation, Technology and Digital Transformation Committee	37	36
(thousands of €)	Total 2026	Total 2025
Remuneration to be distributed in 2026 under the maximum remuneration to be approved at the 2026 General Meeting of Shareholders	5,150	5,000




5.2 REMUNERATION OF DIRECTORS DISCHARGING EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS

By way of summary, the remuneration mix corresponding to the package envisaged for CaixaBank's Chief Executive Officer in 2026 is reflected below. It should be noted that, from the start of 2025, the Chief Executive Officer assumed the executive responsibilities that previously fell to the Chairman, thus becoming the only director with executive functions.

Preliminary considerations

1. The leadership of the Chief Executive Officer and the excellent performance in this role have been decisive, both in ending 2025 well above the initial forecasts and in ensuring the 2025-2027 Strategic Plan began with operational and financial indicators clearly beyond the targets set in the Plan.
- | 2025 was marked by the normalisation of interest rates and the acceleration of investment, with profitability remaining high. The ROTE stood at 17.5%, well above the cost of capital and historical average, and net profit reached €5,891 million.. Year-on-year growth stood at 1.8 % and performance was 15 % higher than expected by the consensus of analysts just before the start of the year.¹



- Total annual fixed remuneration
- Benefits in kind and other benefits
- Pension scheme (fixed contribution)
- Pension scheme (contribution on a variable basis)
- Short-term variable remuneration
- Long-term variable remuneration

¹ Based on the analysts' consensus at year-end 2024.

- | Despite the significant investment effort to accelerate the Bank's transformation, one of the key pillars of the 2025-2027 Strategic Plan, the efficiency ratio, stood at 39.4 % in 2025, well below the average of European peers and 18 percentage points lower than in 2021, excluding extraordinary expenses, when the merger with Bankia was completed¹.
- | The balance sheet has further strengthened its robustness, with capital and liquidity ratios well above regulatory requirements. The NPL ratio continued to fall, reaching a new historical low of 2.07 %, two years ahead of the target set in the 2025-2027e² Strategic Plan of around 2 % at the end of 2027. NPL coverage increased 8 percentage points in the year to 77 %, reaching its most comfortable level since 2013.
- | The focus on accelerating growth -another key pillar of the 2025-2027 Strategic Plan-, as well as the strong commercial drive, led to growth of 7 % in business volumes in 2025, compared to the Plan's initial target of >4 % compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2025-2027e, supported by both assets and liabilities, and protection insurance premiums growing by 13 % (vs. the Plan's target of around 10 % CAGR 2025-2027e). Targets were surpassed for all major volume categories, while the customer base grew by approximately 390,000 during the year³ and market share was gained across the market⁴: +100 bps in penetration of individual customers, +14 bps in loans and advances to customers, +12 bps in deposits, +19 bps in savings insurance, +119 bps in life insurance and +27 bps in direct payroll deposits. Gaining share from a leading position is a particularly noteworthy achievement.
- | In the ESG area, the main objectives for the year were also comfortably met. The mobilisation of sustainable financing reached €46,167 million in 2025, 136 % of the annual target (€33,928 million) and contributed to the goal of mobilising more than €100 billion over the 2025-2027 period. In addition, the objective of performing annual *engagement* actions was met, with 90 % of the companies with credit exposure in sectors under the Net Zero perimeter coming to approximately 94 %. In 2025, progress was also made towards the goal of becoming a sustainability benchmark, with improvements in the main ratings. CaixaBank was the only Spanish bank to achieve MSCI's highest rating of AAA (Leader) (previously

AA) and improved its Sustainalytics ESG Risk Rating to 9.5 points, "Negligible" risk (from 13 points previously, considered "Low" risk).

As a result, the company's leadership in its reference market and its financial and operational strength were reinforced once again, placing it in its best position in more than a decade.



¹ Based on the information published by the individual banks as at 30 January 2026, the average cost-to-income ratio of the 10 largest banks by market capitalisation in the Euro Stoxx Banks index was 51.1 %.

² 2025-27e refers to the financial targets set for the end of the plan.

³ In Spain.

⁴ Penetration and market share in Spain.

2. The solid start to the 2025–2027 Strategic Plan and the excellent operational and financial performance recorded during its first year not only places the bank in an optimal position to continue to successfully implement its strategic priorities, but significantly strengthens the Group's future prospects. This has enabled CaixaBank to increase its medium-term objective, in terms of growth, profitability, efficiency and credit quality, with an improvement in the main objectives of the Strategic Plan in place, including:

- | Profitability (ROTE 2027e): target revised upwards to "~20 %" (vs. ">16 %" initially).
- | Cost-to-income ratio (2027e): Target revised downwards to "high 30s" (vs. "low 40s" initially).
- | Growth in business volume (CAGR 2025–2027e): revised upwards to "~6 %" (vs. ">4 %" initially).
- | NPL ratio (2027e): Target revised downwards to "<1.75 %" (vs. "~2 %" initially).
- | Capital and distribution targets: remain the same.

This improvement reflects the well-defined strategic direction and a disciplined and rigorous focus on execution driven by senior management, enabling the bank not only to far exceed the expectations set out in the Plan presented to the market in November 2024, but also to expand its objectives for the future.

3. The share price performance reflects the market's confidence in the Bank's strategy and management, as well as the positive assessment of the Bank's more ambitious Plan following its very solid start and focus on growth and transformation.

- | Year-on-year revaluation in 2025 exceeded that of the benchmark indices, with the share price reaching new all-time highs: +99.5 % CaixaBank; +80.3 % Euro Stoxx Banks; +49.3 % IBEX 35. Given this year's performance, the accumulated appreciation since the end of 2021 stands at +332.7% for CaixaBank, compared with +162.1% for Euro Stoxx Banks and +98.6% for the IBEX 35. Despite this strong revaluation, c. 85% of analysts covering the stock maintained a Buy or Hold recommendation at year-end 2025¹.
- | CaixaBank moved up in the market capitalisation ranking of euro area financial institutions included in the Euro Stoxx Banks index, currently placing 6th.² This means that it has climbed 2 positions since the close of 2024 and 5 positions in the last 10 years.
- | CaixaBank is now quoted at a quality premium compared to the rest of its Eurozone peers: At the end of 2025, CaixaBank was trading at a PER26 > 12.4 times, above the Euro Stoxx Banks index average (11.2 times) and also above any of the 20 largest banks by market capitalisation in the index at that date. This differential reflects the market's confidence in the quality of the franchise and the visibility of its future results.
- | On the day the update of the 2025–27e Plan³ objectives was released, CaixaBank's share price rose +6.7% (vs. +1.8% for Euro Stoxx Banks), underscoring the market's positive reaction.



¹ Based on analysts' consensus as of 30 January 2026.

² At 9 February 2026.

³ At year-end 2025.



4. Financial strength has also been reflected in improved credit ratings and credit markets.

| In 2025, Moody's and S&P Global upgraded the rating of all CaixaBank's debt instruments. Specifically, the long-term issuer ratings were set at A2 (from A3) and A+ (from A), respectively. In addition, Moody's upgraded the short-term rating to P-1 from P-2. Meanwhile, Fitch upgraded the short-term rating to F1 and revised the long-term rating outlook to A- positive (from A- stable). Similarly, Moody's & S&P Global upgraded the ratings on CaixaBank's mortgage covered bond programme to the maximum level of Aaa and AAA, respectively.

| The continued improvement in balance sheet strength has also been reflected in the secondary credit markets, with a reduction in the spreads demanded by investors on the Bank's debt. For example, according to Bloomberg data, CaixaBank's senior non-preferred bond issued in January 2025, maturing in 2036, moved from trading at a risk premium over the Euribor curve of 135 bps at issuance to around 100 bps by year-end. The change in this spread versus German government debt was similar.

5. In an increasingly complex competitive environment – marked by technological disruption, the appearance of new competitors, a growing domestic market and an increasing demand for highly specialist profiles with leadership and implementation skills – at the same time as new opportunities, the retention and loyalty of talent takes on even greater strategic relevance. This is key to ensuring the future performance of the entity, reinforcing its leadership and guaranteeing the sustained achievement of its strategic objectives.

In this context, the appropriate remuneration of the functions performed, as well as the level of dedication, responsibility and commitment required, is reaffirmed as an essential pillar of the Group's Remuneration Policy . This approach not only ensures full alignment with corporate objectives, but also acts as an essential mitigating mechanism against the growing risk of losing key talent and critical professionals. It also preserves vision and ability to execute in a particularly demanding environment, especially when the stock is trading at a premium to its peers, which naturally increases expectations of performance and consistency in value creation for all its stakeholders .

Consequently, and based on the proposal from the Remuneration Committee, the Board of Directors considers it essential to establish a fully adequate and competitive remuneration level relative to comparable entities, drawing on professional salary surveys and benchmark studies by leading specialised firms¹.

6. In addition, this Remuneration Policy aims to continue promoting a balanced weighting between fixed and variable remuneration, in line with market best practices and investor-community preferences.
7. Comparison with reference peers shows that greater convergence remains in the remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer, which continues to evolve in line with comparable international standards.

The 2025 remuneration benchmarking was carried out by the external advisor WTW/Willis Towers Watson, taking as a reference two groups of entities selected for their comparability with the CaixaBank Group at present, in terms of business model or size and relevance. The first group is composed of peers listed on the IBEX 35 and the second is composed

¹ The Remuneration Committee was advised by Ernst & Young Abogados S.L.P. ("EY") in the preparation the amendment to the Remuneration Policy, which will be submitted to the 2026 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, as well as Willis Towers Watson for market analysis and benchmarking regarding the remuneration and compensation of executive directors and senior management.

of European financial institutions. See Section 3.2. of this report for more details.

As regards the IBEX 35, in an overall view, CaixaBank's size (by income, market capitalisation, assets and employees) is among the 75th percentile (income and employees) and 90th percentile (market capitalisation and assets) of the market. In comparison with European financial institutions, CaixaBank's overall size is around the median and around the 75th percentile in terms of market capitalisation.

The main conclusions of the remuneration performance analysis compared to both benchmarks are as follows:


- | In terms of target total remuneration, the Chief Executive Officer's remuneration is below both the 50th percentile of the group of financial institutions and, to an even greater extent, the 75th percentile of the IBEX 35; in both cases, therefore, is below the percentile that would correspond to CaixaBank based on its size and on its performance (see charts below).¹ Although the remuneration measures adopted in previous years have partially reduced this gap, a negative differential remains, especially in variable remuneration, which is still much lower than that of both groups of peers and more pronounced compared to the IBEX 35. The differential is unchanged when comparing the remuneration percentile with the performance of TSR (Total Shareholders Return) over the last four years.



¹ Percentile calculations are based on the group of peers defined in Section 3.2.


TOTAL TARGET REMUNERATION 2025 (PERCENTILE) VS. TSR (PERCENTILE BASED ON THE ANNUALISED PERFORMANCE OF THE LAST 4 YEARS)¹

CAIXABANK VS. A SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS



- Percentile held by CaixaBank by size (measured by total revenue, assets and employees) i.e. c.50 %
- Percentile held by CaixaBank by market capitalisation, i.e. c.75 %

CAIXABANK VS. A SAMPLE OF IBEX 35 COMPANIES



- Percentile held by CaixaBank by size (measured by total income, assets and employees) i.e. c.75 %
- Percentile held by CaixaBank by market capitalisation, i.e. c.90 %

¹ Sources: Remuneration benchmark drawn up by WTW and Bloomberg. The percentiles correspond to the sample of comparable European financial institutions in the first chart, and to comparable IBEX 35 companies in the second. The TSR corresponds to the annualised change in the TSR index between year-end 2021 and year-end 2025. For companies that have been listed for less than four years, from their stock market listing date.

- | In terms of fixed remuneration and pensions, the Chief Executive Officer's remuneration is reasonably competitive with the 50th percentile of financial institutions and compared with IBEX 35 companies, given CaixaBank's size and relevance, it would be between the 75th and 90th percentile among that group of peers. To maintain this competitiveness in terms of real remuneration, the proposal must be updated.
- | In the particular case of variable remuneration, a substantial unfavourable imbalance remain compared to both groups of peers: the Chief Executive Officer's target variable remuneration is around the 25th percentile of both the IBEX 35 group and the European financial institutions group, which makes it more than 40 % below the median in both cases . The magnitude of this differential confirms that there is still a significant convergence gap and that the current position remains objectively below the levels that would correspond to a reasonable comparison.

This situation is partly explained by recent changes in market practices. In the group of financial institutions, the weight of variable remuneration in total remuneration *target* has increased significantly in recent years. The review of the variable remuneration scheme applicable to the Chief Executive Officer approved in 2022, which replaced the Bonus + ILP scheme with a system based on annual and multi-year metrics, strengthened the long-term variable component in the target total remuneration. However, the increase in the weight of the variable for the Chief Executive Officer was proportionally lower than seen on the market, which has widened the relative differential, meaning that variable remuneration is now the element for which the gap is widest compared to peers.

In light of the above, starting with the excellent performance achieved in 2025, which, thanks to outstanding execution, has enabled us to significantly raise the bar set in the 2025-2027 Strategic Plan and continue driving both the financial robustness (our best position in more than a decade) and the share price and capitalisation of the bank, as well as considering the priority of preserving management talent, fostering the long-term commitment of a top-tier Chief Executive Officer and continuing to close the gap with the market in his remuneration, the Board has proposed adjusting his remuneration to a more competitive level.

In addition to being better aligned with market benchmarks, this adjustment is fully aligned with the principles of meritocracy and *pay-for-performance* inherent to our policy. It is also better aligned with his level of responsibility and the strategic impact of his role, bearing in mind that the review of the strategic objectives in January 2026, with more demanding and challenging targets linked to financial performance, presents an added challenge for the Chief Executive Officer, to which his remuneration is linked. They also maintain a greater consistency with CaixaBank's current position as one of the six largest financial institutions in the Eurozone by market capitalisation and with the need to ensure the stability and future projection of the entity.

The recent excellent performance also builds on a sustained track record of success and leadership since June 2014, when he took up his current duties. During this period, the Group's market capitalisation has more than tripled; CaixaBank has consolidated its position as the leading bank by assets and customers in Spain and total shareholder return has grown by more than 340 %¹, well above the benchmark indices.

The combination of the extraordinary historical performance of the Bank under the leadership of the current Chief Executive Officer and the momentum gained in 2025, which has reinforced the Bank's strength and raised its strategic ambition, combined with the unfavourable pay gap that still exists with respect to the market, justifies an adjustment in his salary aimed at preserving the continuity and robustness of the corporate project. This adjustment would help to ensure that the company maintains the necessary managerial capabilities to continue to create value for all stakeholders, in the same way that it has been decisively creating value to date.


¹ As at 2 February 2026 and since 30 June 2014.

The following aspects of the proposed changes to the Chief Executive Officer's remuneration are particularly noteworthy:

- | They make it possible to continue reducing the existing breach in relation to the IBEX 35 peer group. In terms of size, CaixaBank ranks in the 75th percentile (in income and employees) and the 90th percentile (in market capitalisation and assets) of the IBEX 35 peer group, while the proposed adjustment places total target remuneration between the median and the 75th percentile of that group, thus remaining below the range to which it would correspond by size. In particular, in terms of the fixed remuneration + company benefits, the Policy includes the updated remuneration proposed for the Chief Executive Officer, with an increase of 3 % vs. 2025, which largely maintains the level of real remuneration, offsetting the effect of inflation.¹
- | They allow CaixaBank to maintain a total target remuneration that is reasonably competitive at a European level, as it remains between the median and the 75th percentile of the European peer group, while in terms of market capitalisation, it would be in the 75th percentile. It should also be noted that CaixaBank's profitability in 2025 would stand above the median of this group² and the improvement in TSR in 2025 would also have been 17 percentage points higher.
- | They allow progress to be made in reducing the gap vs. peers in the remuneration mix. It should be noted that the proposed target variable remuneration would still be more than 10 % below the median of both peer groups and, therefore, significantly below what would correspond to CaixaBank given its size in both peer groups: European and IBEX 35 companies. See chart on Comparative Variable Target Remuneration.

| They contribute to rebalancing the remuneration mix towards a greater weight of variable remuneration, linking payment to the achievement of objectives (pay-for-performance), in line with market best practices and the preferences of the investment community. In addition, variable remuneration includes multi-year metrics that can only apply as a possible decrease in deferred variable remuneration subject to these metrics with a degree of achievement in the range of [0-100 %] and partial payment of 70 % in shares, which better aligns remuneration with shareholders' interests. See chart on Remuneration mix of comparative groups and remuneration of mix of the Chief Executive Officer for 2025 vs. the remuneration mix of the Chief Executive Officer with the proposed remuneration for 2026.

COMPARISON OF TARGET VARIABLE REMUNERATION³




¹The increase in fixed remuneration for CaixaBank's workforce will be more than 4 % in 2026, comprising the 3 % increase established in the collective bargaining agreement plus the increases due to labour agreements.
² Based on Bloomberg data and estimates for ROTE 2025 as of 2 February 2026.
³ Amounts in thousands of €. Source: WTW


REMUNERATION MIX OF COMPARISON GROUPS AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER MIX, IN 2025¹:

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER'S REMUNERATION MIX WITH THE REMUNERATION PROPOSAL FOR 2026²:



50th percentile Financial institutions



75th percentile IBEX 35



Chief Executive CaixaBank



Variable remuneration
 Fixed remuneration
 Pension scheme




¹ Source: WTW

² Remuneration in kind and other benefits are not considered in the benchmarking due to the homogeneity of the data available in the study.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the proposed changes are supported by the Bank's financial performance and are aligned with other measures adopted by CaixaBank with respect to other stakeholders:

Financial performance: CaixaBank recognised attributable profit of €5,891 million in 2025, achieving a ROTE of 17.5 % (compared to an average of 9.5 % from 2015–24)^{1,2} and a cost to income ratio of 39.4 % (compared to an average of 50.5 % from 2015–24)³. The NPL ratio continued to decline to 2.07 %, while solvency and liquidity remained strong.

ROBUST EARNINGS PERFORMANCE⁴ AND TSR




Shareholders: the Board of Directors proposed paying a cash dividend of 0.3321 euros gross per share charged to 2025 results to the General Meeting of Shareholders. This amount is in addition to the interim dividend of 0.1679 euros gross per share paid in November 2025, making for a total of 0.50 euros gross per share in cash. This represents an increase of 15 % compared to the dividend per share for the 2024 results and a *payout ratio* of 59.4 %, compared to 53.5 % in the previous year. In addition, further share buyback programmes worth €1 billion have been initiated and implemented (or are underway⁵) in 2025 which, when added to the cash dividend of €3.5 billion, bring the total distribution to around €4.5 billion in 2025. The sum of the dividend per share payable charged to 2025 results plus the value to cash per share at the end of 2025, adjusted excluding the proposed final dividend, increased by 16 % compared to the 2024 equivalent, vs. +91 % for the Euro Stoxx Banks and +55 % for the IBEX 35. When analysing the change in TSR over the last three and five years, CaixaBank also performed significantly better than the Euro Stoxx Banks and IBEX 35 in both periods.

VARIATION IN TSR*

	5 years	3 years	1 year
CABK	564.9 %	259.5 %	112.1 %
SX7E	376.4 %	231.1 %	90.8 %
IBEX 35	158.5 %	138.7 %	55.3 %

*Total Shareholder Return, Source: Bloomberg



¹ From 2022 under IFRS 17; 2015–2021 based on previously reported figures (IFRS 4). 2021 PF including 12 months with Bankia.

² Excludes non-recurring impacts of the restructuring process in 2019 and the merger in 2021.

³ Adjusted historical series excluding one-off merger and restructuring costs in 2019, 2023 and 2024 PF adjusted to exclude the impact of the bank levy to maintain consistency with 2025.


⁴ 2022–2025 under IFRS 17. 2021 PF including Bankia for 12 months and excluding extraordinary impacts from the merger.

⁵ The 7th SBB was still under way as of February 2026.

TSR PERFORMANCE 2021-2025
(CLOSE OF 2020 AS BASE 100)



PERFORMANCE OF TOTAL TARGET REMUNERATION VS. TSR



Customers: CaixaBank continues to strengthen its customer service model which places trust and quality of service at its core, with clear progress being made during the past year. In 2025, there was a net increase of 390,000 new customers in Spain, shoring up the Company's position as a preferred bank for individuals, raising the penetration rate to 40.4 % (+100 bp in the year)¹ and cementing its position as the main bank for 72 % of these customers². At the same time, the offer of products and services was further broadened, with the launch of innovative initiatives, such as Generación+, FaciliteaCoches, FaciliteaCasa or the Cashback programme, which attracted 1.3 million customers in just three months. The digital channels were also developed with the progressive roll-out of the new app, which received the highest rating for banking apps in Spain on Google Play³. These advances were reflected in a clear improvement in the customer experience, with the relational NPS increasing by more than 5 percentage points in 2025 to stand at 20.8 % (vs. 15.7 % in 2024), while the main transactional NPS segments also saw significant gains (+c.4 percentage points for Retail Signature, to 83.4 %; +c.6 percentage points for Business banking, to 97.7 %; and +0.7 percentage points for Private banking, to 98.0 %). This progress was also recognised externally, through awards such as Best Bank in Spain, 2025 (Euromoney and Global Finance), Best Bank for Consumers in Europe, 2025 (Euromoney) and Best Bank in Western Europe, 2025 (Global Finance).

Employees: the sector signed a Collective Agreement for Savings Banks and Financial Institutions for 2024-2026 on 18 April 2024. This Agreement allows employees to recover purchasing power by providing for a salary review of 11 % over three years, together with a one-off payment of €1,000 for the entire workforce, among other improvement measures. In 2026, in particular, the increase in the fixed remuneration of CaixaBank's workforce will be more than 4 %, with a 3 % increase established in the collective bargaining agreement plus the increases due to labour agreements. The CaixaBank Group created 1,106 new jobs in 2025, expanding its workforce for the second consecutive year. Finally, CaixaBank was named the "Top Employer Spain 2026" by the Top Employer Institute, highlighting the quality of the professional environment, the commitment to developing talent and the continuous improvement of the Company's people management practices.

Society: CaixaBank's sound financial position has enabled the Group to continue to strengthen its firm commitment to society and sustainability, meeting the non-financial targets of the first year of the 2025-2027 Strategic Plan and increasing its social dividend. It should also be noted that almost 50 % of CaixaBank's profit is attributable to two significant shareholders which, by their nature, have a direct impact on Spanish society. Thus, in 2025, the dividend received by these two shareholders is expected to increase by around 13 %⁴ on a year-on-year basis. Lastly, it should be noted that CaixaBank has been recognised as the World's Best Bank for its commitment to society by Global Finance.

¹ Source: FRS Inmark 2025.

² % of customers (individuals ≥ 18 years of age in Spain) for whom the entity is their main bank. Based on data from FRS Inmark 2025.

³ CaixaBank Now. Source: Google Play at 19 January 2026. a. The peer group includes: Abanca, Banco Sabadell, Banco Santander, Bankinter, BBVA, ING, N26 and Revolut.

⁴ Based on the latest public information on the position of the la Caixa Foundation and the FROB in CaixaBank's shareholding structure.

FIXED COMPONENTS OF REMUNERATION

The amount of the fixed components of remuneration accruable by executive directors in 2026 is as follows:

_REMUNERATION LINKED TO FIXED COMPONENTS FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

(thousands of €)	Position	Salaries	Remuneration for board membership	Remuneration for membership on board committees	Remuneration for positions in Group companies	Remuneration for membership of boards outside the Group	Total annual fixed remuneration forecast for 2026
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	2,124	114	62	360		2,660

Executive directors are also due to accrue the following amounts of remuneration in kind during the year:

_REMUNERATION IN KIND OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS

(thousands of €)	Position	Private medical insurance for themselves and their families*	Use of company car and housing	Others	Total projected for 2026
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	5		19	24

* Medical insurance for the Chief Executive Officer, spouse, and children aged under 25.

VARIABLE COMPONENTS OF REMUNERATION

VARIABLE REMUNERATION PACKAGE WITH MULTI-YEAR METRICS

The target amounts for this item established in 2026 are as follows:

(thousands of €)	Position	Variable remuneration target (thousands of €)
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	2,620

Annual factors, with quantitative corporate (financial) and qualitative corporate (non-financial) criteria, which must be specified and clearly documented, are used for performance measurement and for the evaluation of results.

In addition, multi-year factors based exclusively on corporate criteria are also used, which adjust, as a reduction mechanism, the payment of the deferred portion subject to multi-year factors.

Although the variable component of the remuneration of executive directors shall be limited to a maximum amount of 100 % of the fixed remuneration, unless the CaixaBank Annual General Meeting of Shareholders approves a higher level with a limit of 200 %, the following maximum amounts to be received by executive directors and the corresponding % of fixed remuneration shall apply:

_ESTIMATION OF VARIABLE REMUNERATION SCHEME WITH MULTI-YEAR METRICS 2025

(thousands of €)	Chief Executive Officer
Variable remuneration with achievement level <80 %	0
Variable remuneration with achievement level 100 %	2,620
% Variable remuneration 100 % on fixed components	79.7%
Maximum variable remuneration with achievement level 120 %	3,144
% variable remuneration 120 % on fixed components	95.6%



_ANNUAL FACTOR MEASUREMENT METRICS

Corporate criteria	Metric	Weighting	Degree of compliance	Degree of achievement
Financial	ROTE	20%	> 20.1%	120%
			Between 20.1 % and 15.2 %	Between 120 % and 80 %
			< 15.2%	0%
	Recurring Efficiency ratio	15%	< 38.5%	120%
			Between 38.5 % and 41.7 %	Between 120 % and 80 %
	NPA's variation in millions of €	10%	> 41.7%	0%
			< -2,146 M €	120%
	Market share	10%	Between -€2.146 M and -€1,448 M €	Between 120 % and 80 %
			>-1,448 million €	0%
	Non-financial	RAF ¹	20%	>+0.45 pp
Between +0.25 pp and +0.45 pp				Between 100 % and 120 %
Between +0.05 pp and +0.25 pp				100%
Between - 0.15 pp and +0.05 pp				Between 80 % and 100 %
< -0.15 pp				0%
0 ambers				105%
0.5 ambers				102.5%
1 amber				100%
1.5 ambers				97.5%
2 ambers				95%
2.5 ambers	92.5%			
3 ambers	90%			
3.5 ambers	87.5%			
4 ambers	85%			
4.5 ambers	82.5%			
5 ambers	80.0%			
>= 5.5 ambers	0%			
Quality	15%	Relational NPS (60 %)	> 24%	120%
			Between 20 % and 24 %	Between 100 % and 120 %
			Between 17 % and 20 %	100%
			Between 13 % and 17 %	Between 80% and 100%
			< 13%	0%
			> 68.4%	120%
Transactional NPS (40 %)	10%	Between 64.4 % and 68.4 %	Between 80 % and 120 %	
		< 64.4%	0%	
Sustainability factors (environmental, social and governance)	10%	Combination of ESG targets:		
		Cumulative mobilisation of sustainable finance (25%): Between €38,656 million and €57,984 million		
		% companies with credit exposure to sectors under the Net Zero perimeter at the end of 2024 with which engagement has taken place during the year (25%): between 80% and 100%		
		Above-average recognition among two to four agencies of the main sustainability ratings among European benchmark peers of Euro Stoxx Banks (MSCI, S&P, Sustainalytics, Fitch, ISS) (25%)		
		% women in management positions (25%): between 44.4% and 44.6%	Between 120% and 80% below 0%	

A negative adjustment of 5 % is included should a certain number of high and medium criticality compliance gaps older than 6 and 12 months, respectively, be exceeded at year-end 2026.

¹ Achievement may be adjusted downwards to 100 % in the event that any metrics included in the RAF are in recovery.

The degree of achievement for the annual factor measurement metrics is determined solely on the basis of corporate criteria and includes the upfront payment of the variable remuneration as well as the first two deferred payments (i.e. 64 % of the variable remuneration).

The corporate criteria are set for each year by the CaixaBank Board of Directors at the recommendation of the Remuneration Committee, and their weighting is distributed among objective items based on the Bank's main targets.

The **corporate financial criteria** have been aligned with the Bank's most relevant management metrics, adapting their weighting for the executive directors according to their functions. These are related to the following metrics:

ROTE (Return on Tangible Equity) (20 %)

Definition: Measures the profitability index of the tangible assets and is calculated as the Profit/(loss) attributable to the Group (adjusted by the amount of the Additional Tier 1 coupon) and net equity plus valuation adjustments for the last 12 months, minus the intangible assets such as goodwill.

Recurring Efficiency ratio (15 %)

Definition: This is the weight of recurring expenses in relation to the institution's gross margin. It is calculated as the percentage ratio of the Group's recurring expenses to the gross income.

Variation in NPAs (10 %)

Definition: This is the change, in absolute terms, in the Group's problematic assets (defined as non-performing and foreclosed loans and auction rights).

Market share (10 %)

Definition: This metric measures the variation in overall market share, including credit and funds from the non-financial private sector in Spain.

It is calculated by comparing the average market share from September to November 2025 with the average market share from September to November 2026.

Non-financial corporate criteria relate to the following metrics:

RAF (Risk Appetite Framework) (20 %)

Definition: The objective related to the RAF metric is established based on an aggregation of the tier 1 metrics scorecard of the Company's Risk Appetite Framework. This scorecard consists of quantitative metrics that measure the different risks, for which the Board of Directors establishes areas of appetite (green), tolerance (amber) or non-compliance (red), and determines the scale of fulfilment that establishes penalty or bonus percentages according to the variation of each metric, between the actual situation at the end of the year and that initially forecast for the same year in the budget.

The RAF scorecard enables the monitoring of financial, non-financial, and cross-cutting risks. In particular, it includes risks such as operational risk, conduct risk and reputational risk. The scope of these metrics covers the entire CaixaBank Group. From a reputational perspective, the scorecard directly considers sustainability-related aspects, as well as those linked to cybersecurity, data protection and customer experience. These aspects, in turn, are the ones that emerge as material in the Double Materiality Study 2025.

Quality (15 %)

Definition: This metric combines the Net Promoter Score index (an index created based on information obtained from customers who would recommend CaixaBank) from different areas of the organisation. 60 % is defined according to the Relational NPS, which measures the overall level of customer satisfaction with CaixaBank, and 40 % according to the synthetic Transactional NPS, which measures satisfaction following interaction with the Bank's various channels.

This challenge is related to material subtopic "Value proposition, responsible marketing and customer satisfaction" included in the 2025 Double Materiality Assessment, and reflects CaixaBank's commitment to maintain an efficient customer service model adapted to customer preferences, measuring quality by specific segments, pursuing the financial inclusion of all of society, as set out in our 2025-2027 Strategic Plan.

Sustainability (10 %)

Definition: This is a synthetic metric that combines four different indicators, each with a weight of 25 %.

- | Sustainable finance mobilisation, in accordance with the target of the 2025-2027 Sustainability Plan. The calculation of the challenge does not take into account the market effect on the figure for the increase in sustainable assets under management, without altering the target set out in the plan for the period.
- | Percentage of customer companies falling within the Net Zero perimeter with whom engagement work has been carried out during the year to align borrowers with the decarbonisation commitments communicated by the Bank.
- | Recognition of the main sustainability ratings (MSCI, S&P, Sustainalytics, Fitch, ISS) that are above average compared to peers listed in the Euro Stoxx Banks index.
- | Percentage of women in management positions.

For the purpose of determining variable remuneration for the annual factors (financial and non-financial) described above, once the 2026 financial year has ended, the result of each metric will be compared with its target value, and depending on the degree of compliance with the target value, variable remuneration to be received will be calculated by applying the corresponding scales of degree of achievement, according to the weighting associated with each indicator, on the basis of the target value.

The resulting amount shall constitute the annual factor-linked variable remuneration of each executive director, which shall be subject to the terms of the vesting, consolidation and payment system set out below.

This challenge features in the Double Materiality Study 2025 and is linked to the material subtopic "Diversity, Equity and Inclusion".

Compliance (Adjustment of 5 %)

Definition: The adjustment is determined based on high- and medium-risk regulatory compliance GAPS identified by the Compliance department.

A penalty of up to 5 % of the total variable remuneration granted will be applied depending on the number of GAPS and the timeframe for resolution.



MULTI-YEAR FACTOR MEASUREMENT METRICS

Criteria	Metric	Weighting	Target Value	Degree of compliance	Degree of penalty
Corporate	CETI	25%	RAF measure for risk tolerance in green	Red = 0 %	100%
				Amber = 50 %	50%
				Green = 100 %	0%
	TSR	25%	VTSR CABK / VTSR SX7e	VTSR CABK / VTSR SX7e >= 100 %	0%
				VTSR CABK / VTSR SX7e >= 90 % and < 100 %	Between 0% and 20%
				VTSR CABK / VTSR SX7e < 90 %	100%
	Multi-year ROTE	25%	Average of amounts challenged annually over the measurement period	>Average = 100 %	0%
				Between 80 % and 100 %	Between 0% and 100%
				< 80% = 0%	100%
				> = 147,108 million € = 100%	0%
Sustainability Factors	25%	Sustainable finances (75 %)	Between €147,108 million and €110,331 million € = between 75 % and 100 %	Between 0% and 100%	
			< 110,331 million € = 0%	100%	
			> = 45% = 100%	0%	
% of women in management positions (25 %)			Between 44.6 % and 45 % between 75 % and 100 %	Between 0% and 100%	
			< 44,6% = 0%	100%	

The level of achievement for the multi-year factor metrics is set solely on the basis of corporate criteria and determines the adjustment of payments from the third year of deferral (i.e. 36 % of the remaining variable remuneration).

The metrics associated with the multi-year factors are described below:

CETI (25 %)

Definition: It is set as a metric linked to the colour (tolerance level) of the indicator in the CETI RAF at the end of the multi-year period.

The colour determines the risk tolerance level in accordance with the risk appetite areas established by the Board of Directors. Green means ending within the tolerance level, amber means being at the tolerance level, and red means being at the non-compliance level.

TSR (25 %)

Definition: Comparison of the performance of CaixaBank's TSR in relation to the performance of the TSR of the Euro Stoxx Banks index (SX7e) during the period considered. Definition of the metric:

- | VTSR is defined as (1+% TSR change during the period considered) and applied to VTSR CABK and VTSR SX7e
- | The performance indicator is obtained as the ratio between VTSR CABK / VTSR SX7e

As in the case of the other multi-year factors, and taking into account, among other things, the differences in terms of geographic diversification between CaixaBank and many of the components of the index, a scale of achievement is established which, in the case of TSR, entails a penalty of 100 % if the ratio VTSR CABK / VTSR SX7e is less than 90 %.

Multi-year ROTE (25 %)

Definition: This is set as the average achievement of the ROTE challenge for each of the years of the multi-year measurement period.



Sustainability (25 %)

Definition: This is a synthetic metric that combines two different indicators.

- | Sustainable finance mobilisation, with a weighting of 75 %, in accordance with the target of the 2025-2027 Sustainability Plan. The market effect will be eliminated when calculating the challenge, without altering the target set out in the plan for the period.
- | Percentage of women in management positions, with a weighting of 25 %.


The metrics indicated above will have associated compliance scales, so that if the targets set for each of them are not met within the three-year measurement period, they may reduce the deferred portion of the variable remuneration pending payment, but never increase it. In addition, the remaining conditions of the system for granting, consolidation and payment of the variable remuneration of executive directors provided for in the Remuneration Policy, described in section 3.2 above, shall apply to the variable remuneration.

In line with our responsible management model, 30 % of the variable remuneration of the Chief Executive Officer is linked to ESG factors. As indicated in the annual metrics shown above, 10 % is linked to Sustainability-related indicators, 15 % is linked to social indicators focusing on Quality and the Customer Experience and there is a possible 5 % reduction linked to Regulatory Compliance and Governance management. Similarly, in the adjustment with multi-year metrics, 25 % is associated with the challenge to mobilise long-term sustainable financing.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE VARIABLE REMUNERATION AWARD, VESTING AND PAYMENT SYSTEM

In accordance with the vesting, consolidation and payment system applicable to variable remuneration under the variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics for the Bank's executive directors, 40 % of the variable remuneration corresponding to the current year will be paid if the conditions are met, in equal parts in cash and CaixaBank shares, while the remaining 60 % will be deferred, 30 % in cash and 70 % in shares, over a period of five years (12 % each year). In this regard, the payment for the first two years of deferral is subject to annual factors, while the payment for the following three years will be subject to compliance with the approved multi-year factors.

The granting, vesting and payment system for the variable remuneration of executive directors is the same as that set out for 2025.



CONTRIBUTIONS TO PENSION SCHEMES AND OTHER BENEFITS

In the case of the Chief Executive Officer, a total defined contribution of €485,350 will be made each year to cover the contingencies of retirement, death and total, absolute or severe permanent disability.

The annual target amount corresponding to the Discretionary Pension Benefits Policy, in accordance with the provisions of the Remuneration Policy), is €85,650 in the case of Mr Gonzalo Gortázar Rotaeché.

In addition to the defined contribution indicated above, coverage will be established for death and permanent, total, absolute and severe disability for the amount of two annuities of the Total Fixed Annual Remuneration at the time the contingency occurs. The estimated premium for this cover is €118,470.

_REMUNERATION OF EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS THROUGH LONG-TERM SAVINGS SYSTEMS

		(thousands of €) Long-term savings system (defined contribution)			
		Position	Fixed component (85 %)	Variable component (15 %) ¹	Death, permanent disability and severe invalidity
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chief Executive Officer	485	94	119	698


¹ Information provided on contributions made to the employee pension system (variable remuneration) envisioned for the year in progress. The achievement of the annual challenges of 109.69 % of the result of the metrics linked to the 2025 annual factors has been considered for the Chief Executive Officer.

REMUNERATIONS TO BOARD MEMBERS AS CONSIDERATION FOR REPRESENTING CAIXABANK

In accordance with the remuneration amounts currently set for the respective companies, which are included within the Total Fixed Annual Remuneration of Directors, the payments related to Directors' roles within the Group or in other companies in the interest of CaixaBank are as follows:

_REMUNERATION AS DIRECTORS ON BEHALF OF CAIXABANK

(thousands of €)	Position	Investee	Total projected for 2026
Gonzalo Gortázar	Director ¹	Banco BPI	47
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chairman ²	CaixaBank Payments & Consumer	3
Gonzalo Gortázar	Chairman	VidaCaixa	310
Tomás Muniesa	Deputy Chairman	ECSC	17
Total per item 2026			377



REMUNERATION ASIDE FROM RESPONSIBILITIES AS DIRECTOR

Fernando Maria Ulrich Costa Duarte is the non-executive Chair of the Board of Directors of Banco BPI. The remuneration planned for his membership of this board in 2026 is €750,000.

RETENTION POLICY

The instruments delivered are subject to a three-year retention period, during which time they may not be disposed of by the Director.

However, one year after the delivery of the instruments, the Director may dispose of the instruments if he/she maintains, after the disposal or exercise, a net economic exposure to the change in the price of the instruments for a market value equivalent to an amount of at least twice his/her total annual fixed remuneration through the ownership of shares, options, rights to deliver shares or other financial instruments reflecting the market value of CaixaBank.

In addition, after the first year of holding, the Director may dispose of the instruments to the extent necessary to meet the costs related to their acquisition or, subject to the favourable opinion of the Remuneration Committee, to meet any extraordinary situations that may arise.

During the retention period, the exercise of the rights conferred by the instruments is vested in the Director as the holder of the instruments.

¹ At the end of his 2023-2025 term of office, without his re-election having been approved, he is expected to remain in office until September 2026, at which time the supervisor's approval for the appointment of board members for the 2026-2028 term of office is expected to be obtained.

² On 28 January 2026, Mr Gonzalo Gortázar resigned as member and Chair of the Board of Directors.

06. Table reconciling the contents with the CNMV remuneration report template

A. REMUNERATION POLICY APPROVED FOR THE CURRENT YEAR

Section of the CNMV template	Included in the statistical report	Comments
A.1 and sub-sections	No	Section 2 and Section 5 in relation to the remuneration policy
		Section 5 in relation to the fixed components of remuneration for directors in their capacity as such
		Section 5 in relation to the different components of remuneration for directors discharging executive functions. Section 4 in relation to the characteristics of contracts entered into with directors discharging executive functions
		Section 5 in relation to the modifications proposed in the compensation package for the financial year 2025 and its quantitative assessment
A.2.	No	Section 5 in relation to the modifications proposed in the compensation package for the financial year 2025 and its quantitative assessment.
A.3	No	Section 5 and Introduction in relation to the remuneration policy
A.4	No	Introduction, Section 2 and Section 5 in relation to the voting on the annual remuneration report and the remuneration policy

B. OVERALL SUMMARY OF HOW THE REMUNERATION POLICY WAS APPLIED DURING THE YEAR

Section of the CNMV template	Included in the statistical report	Comments
B.1 and sub-sections	No	Section 2 and Section 3
B.2	No	Section 2 and Section 3
B.3	No	Section 2, Section 3 and Section 5
B.4	Yes	Section 2 and Section 7
B.5	No	Section 3
B.6	No	Section 3
B.7	No	Section 3
B.8	No	Set not applicable in the EU
B.9	No	Section 3
B.10	No	Section 3
B.11	No	Section 3 and Section 4

B. OVERALL SUMMARY OF HOW THE REMUNERATION POLICY WAS APPLIED DURING THE YEAR

Section of the CNMV template	Included in the statistical report	Comments
B.12	No	Set not applicable in the EU
B.13	No	CaixaBank does not currently envisage the assignment of financial facilities as a means of remunerating its directors. Note 36 of the consolidated annual financial statements explains the financing extended to directors and other key office holders.
B.14	No	Section 3
B.15	No	Not currently provided
B.16	No	Section 3

C. ITEMISED INDIVIDUAL REMUNERATIONS ACCRUED BY EACH DIRECTOR

Section of the CNMV template	Included in the statistical report	Comments
C	Yes	Section 7
C.1 a) i)	Yes	Section 7
C.1 a) ii)	Yes	Section 7
C.1 a) iii)	Yes	Section 7
C.1 a) iv)	Yes	Section 7
C.1 b) i)	Yes	Section 7
C.1 b) ii)	Yes	Set not applicable in the EU
C.1 b) iii)	Yes	Set not applicable in the EU
C.1 b) iv)	Yes	Set not applicable in the EU
C.1 c)	Yes	Section 7
C.2	Yes	Section 7

D. OTHER INFORMATION OF INTEREST

Section of the CNMV template	Included in the statistical report	Comments
D.	Yes	

07. Statistical information on remuneration required by the CNMV



ISSUER IDENTIFICATION

End of financial year: [31/12/2025]

Tax code: [A08663619]

Corporate name:
[**CAIXABANK, S.A.**]

Registered office:
[CL. PINTOR SOROLLA N.2-4 (VALENCIA)]

B. OVERALL SUMMARY OF HOW THE REMUNERATION POLICY WAS APPLIED DURING THE YEAR

B.4. Report on the result of the advisory vote at the General Meeting of Shareholders on the annual report on remuneration for the previous financial year, indicating the number of abstentions and the number of negative, blank and affirmative votes cast:

	Number	% of total
Votes cast	5,939,938,036	82.79

	Number	% of votes cast
Votes against	61,067,752	1.03
Votes in favour	4,575,081,622	77.02
Blank votes		0.00
Abstentions	1,303,788,662	21.95

C. ITEMISED INDIVIDUAL REMUNERATION ACCRUED BY EACH DIRECTOR

Name	Type	Accrual period financial year 2025
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	Chairman	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	Deputy Chairwoman	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Chief Executive Officer	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	Lead Director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	Independent director	From 06/05/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	Independent director	From 01/01/2025 to 11/04/2025
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	Independent director	From 01/01/2025 to 11/04/2025
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	Independent director	From 01/01/2025 to 11/04/2025
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	Other external director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	Independent director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	Other external director	From 03/06/2025 to 31/12/2025
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO	Independent director	From 11/04/2025 to 31/12/2025
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	Independent director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	Independent director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	Proprietary director	From 26/06/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	Independent director	From 27/05/2025 to 31/12/2025
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ	Proprietary director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ	Proprietary director	From 01/01/2025 to 11/04/2025
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	Independent director	From 01/01/2025 to 31/12/2025

C1. Complete the following tables regarding the individual remuneration accrued by each director (including remuneration received for the performance of executive functions) during the year.

a) Remuneration accrued at the reporting company:

i) Remuneration accrued in cash (thousands of €)

Name	Fixed remuneration	Attendance fees	Remuneration for membership on board committees	Salary	Short-term variable remuneration	Long-term variable remuneration	Termination benefits	Other items	Total financial year 2025	Total financial year 2024
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	1,551		90						1,641	205
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	110		159						269	232
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	110		60	2,104	384	177		13	2,848	2,862
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	153		192						345	305
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	72		47						119	
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	31		27						58	184
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	31		39						70	216
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	31		42						73	232
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	110		102						212	184
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	110		60						170	151
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	64		55						119	
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO	79		74						153	
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	110		188						298	216
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	110		78						188	162
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	57		49						106	
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	66		57						123	
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ	110		60						170	151
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ	31		27						58	184
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	110		186						296	266

Comments¹ :

In accordance with the instructions of the CNMV (Spanish National Securities Market Commission) for completing this report, the amounts included in the cells "Short-term variable remuneration" and "Long-term variable remuneration" correspond to the Chief Executive Officer:

- Short-term variable remuneration: · The portion in cash of the upfront payment of the variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics (20 %), which is due for delivery in 2026.
- Long-term variable remuneration: The cash part of the payment of the deferred part of the variable remuneration plan 2024 (4 %), 2023 (4 %), 2022 (4 %) and 2021 (6 %), the payment of which is due in 2026.

¹ These comments are not included in the official CNMV statistical report due to technical impossibilities, but should be taken into account for the correct interpretation of the Statistical Appendix.

ii) Breakdown of movements in share-based remuneration systems and gross profit of the consolidated shares or financial instruments.

Name	Name of the Plan	Financial instruments at the beginning of financial year 2025		Financial instruments granted during year 2025		Consolidated financial instruments in the fiscal year				Instruments past due and not exercised	Financial instruments at the end of financial year 2025	
		No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent equivalents / shares	Price of the consolidated shares	Gross profit of the consolidated shares or consolidated financial instruments (thousands of €)	No. of instruments	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	Plan											
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	Plan											
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Variable remuneration 2025				111,896		36,095	10.64	384			75,801
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Variable remuneration 2024		98,537				19,709	10.64	210			78,828
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Variable remuneration 2023		97,712				24,428	10.64	260			73,284
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Variable remuneration 2022		70,122				23,374	10.64	249			46,748
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Bonus Plan 2021		36,280				18,140	10.64	193			18,140
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	3rd CAIP cycle 2019-2021		71,136				35,568	10.64	378			35,568
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	Plan											

Name	Name of the Plan	Financial instruments at the beginning of financial year 2025		Financial instruments granted during year 2025		Consolidated financial instruments in the fiscal year				Instruments past due and not exercised	Financial instruments at the end of financial year 2025	
		No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent / shares	Price of the consolidated shares	Gross profit of the consolidated shares or consolidated financial instruments (thousands of €)	No. of instruments	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	Plan											
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	Plan											
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	Plan											
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	Plan											
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	Plan											
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	Plan											
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	Plan											
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PINEIRO	Plan											
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	Plan											
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	Plan											
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	Plan											
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	Plan											
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ	Plan											
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASÍA	Plan											
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	Plan											

Comments ¹:

In accordance with the CNMV's instructions to complete this report, the amounts included in the cell "Consolidated financial instruments in the year" correspond to the Chief Executive Officer:

- The portion in shares of the upfront payment of the 2025 variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics (20 %), which is due for delivery in 2026.
- The portion in shares corresponding to the first deferral of the 2024 variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics (8 %), which is due for delivery in 2026.
- The portion in shares corresponding to the second deferral of the 2024 variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics (8 %), which is due for delivery in 2026.
- The share portion corresponding to the third deferral of the 2022 variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics (8 %), which is due for delivery in 2026.
- The share portion corresponding to the fourth deferral of the 2021 variable remuneration scheme with multi-year metrics (6 %), which is due for delivery in 2026.
- Second delivery of shares from the third cycle of the 2019-2021 CAIP (33 %), which is due for delivery in 2026.

Given that, at the date of authorisation for issue of this report, the shares indicated had not been delivered to their beneficiaries, for the purposes of calculating their cash value, the same average price used to calculate the share portion of the variable remuneration 2025 was used, which corresponds to the average closing price of CaixaBank shares on the stock market sessions running from 1 to 31 January 2026, which was €10.636/share.

All shares delivered carry a retention period of three years from their delivery date. One year after delivery, the Director may dispose of the shares if he or she maintains a net economic exposure to the change in the share price of at least twice his or her annual fixed remuneration by holding shares after the disposal. In addition, after the first year of holding them, the Director may dispose of the shares to the extent necessary to meet the costs related to their acquisition or, subject to the favourable opinion of the Remuneration Committee, to meet any extraordinary situations that may arise.

The total number of shares allocated (both delivered and deferred shares), including in 2025, under the variable remuneration plans for executive directors, members of the Management Committee and other CaixaBank employees, which are pending delivery, represents 0.11 % of the total share capital. Shares are not issued to meet the variable remuneration payment in shares, but are acquired on the market through treasury shares, so that these remuneration plans do not lead to dilution for shareholders.

¹ These comments are not included in the official CNMV statistical report due to technical impossibilities, but should be taken into account for the correct interpretation of the Statistical Appendix.

iii) Long-term savings schemes.

Name	Remuneration from consolidation of rights to saving systems
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO	
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ	
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ	
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	

Name	Contribution by the company in the year (thousands of €)				Cumulative amount of funds (thousands of €)			
	Saving systems with consolidated economic rights		Saving systems with unconsolidated economic rights		Systems with consolidated economic rights		Systems with unconsolidated economic rights	
	Financial year 2025	Financial year 2024	Financial year 2025	Financial year 2024	Financial year 2025	Financial year 2024	Financial year 2025	Financial year 2024
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI					1,450	1,384		
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ								
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE			563	570	3,286	3,155	5,056	4,392
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU								
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE								
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA								
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA								
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ								
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH								
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES								
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN								
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO								
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL								
Mr PETER LÖSCHER								
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN								
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA								
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLA								
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ								
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN								

Comments ¹:

The systems with vested economic rights corresponding to the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer relate their previous management functions and no contribution is made. The increase in accumulated funds is due to the evolution of the market value of these funds.

¹ These comments are not included in the official CNMV statistical report due to technical impossibilities, but should be taken into account for the correct interpretation of the Statistical Appendix.

iv) Detail of other concepts.

Name	Item	Remuneration amount
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI		
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ		
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Health Insurance	5
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Life insurance risk premium	111
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU		
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE		
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA		
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA		
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ		
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH		
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES		
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN		
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO		
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL		
Mr PETER LÖSCHER		
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN		
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA		
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ		
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ		
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN		

b) Remuneration paid to directors of the listed company for membership of the governing bodies of its subsidiaries:

i) Remuneration accrued in cash (thousands of €)

Name	Fixed remuneration	Attendance fees	Remuneration for membership on board committees	Salary	Short-term variable remuneration	Long-term variable remuneration	Termination benefits	Other items	Total financial year 2025	Total financial year 2024
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI										435
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ										
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	309								309	95
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU										
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE										
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA										
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA										
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ										
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	750								750	750
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES										
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	45								45	
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO										
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL										
Mr PETER LÖSCHER										
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN										
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA										
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ										
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ										
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN										

ii) Breakdown of movements in share-based remuneration systems and gross profit of the consolidated shares or financial instruments.

Name	Name of the Plan	Financial instruments at the beginning of financial year 2025		Financial instruments granted during year 2025		Consolidated financial instruments in the fiscal year				Instruments past due and not exercised	Financial instruments at the end of financial year 2025	
		No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent / shares	Price of the consolidated shares	Gross profit of the consolidated shares or consolidated financial instruments (thousands of €)	No. of instruments	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	Plan							0.00				
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	Plan							0.00				
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Plan							0.00				
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	Plan							0.00				
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	Plan							0.00				
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	Plan							0.00				
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	Plan							0.00				
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	Plan							0.00				
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	Plan							0.00				
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	Plan							0.00				

Name	Name of the Plan	Financial instruments at the beginning of financial year 2025		Financial instruments granted during year 2025		Consolidated financial instruments in the fiscal year				Instruments past due and not exercised	Financial instruments at the end of financial year 2025	
		No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent equivalents / shares	Price of the consolidated shares	Gross profit of the consolidated shares or consolidated financial instruments (thousands of €)	No. of instruments	No. of instruments	No. of equivalent shares
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	Plan							0.00				
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PINEIRO	Plan							0.00				
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	Plan							0.00				
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	Plan							0.00				
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	Plan							0.00				
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	Plan							0.00				
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ	Plan							0.00				
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ	Plan							0.00				
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	Plan							0.00				

iii) Long-term savings schemes.

Name	Remuneration from consolidation of rights to saving systems
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO	
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ	
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ	
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	

Name	Contribution by the company in the year (thousands of €)				Cumulative amount of funds (thousands of €)			
	Saving systems with consolidated economic rights		Saving systems with unconsolidated economic rights		Systems with consolidated economic rights		Systems with unconsolidated economic rights	
	Financial year 2025	Financial year 2024	Financial year 2025	Financial year 2024	Financial year 2025	Financial year 2024	Financial year 2025	Financial year 2024
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI								
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ								
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE								
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU								
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE								
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA								
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA								
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ								
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH								
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES								
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN								
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO								
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL								
Mr PETER LÖSCHER								
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN								
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA								
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ								
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ								
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN								

iv) Detail of other concepts.

Name	Item	Remuneration amount
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	Item	
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	Item	
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	Item	
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	Item	
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	Item	
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	Item	
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	Item	
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	Item	
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	Item	
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	Item	
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	Item	
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO	Item	
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	Item	
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	Item	
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	Item	
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	Item	
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ	Item	
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASÍA	Item	
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	Item	

c) Summary of remuneration (thousands of €):

The summary should include the amounts for all remuneration components referred to in this report accrued by the director (thousands of €).

Name	Remuneration accrued in the company					Remuneration accrued in group companies					Total financial year 2025 company + group
	Total remuneration in cash	Gross profit of the shares or consolidated financial instruments consolidated	Remuneration from savings systems	Remuneration for other concepts	Total financial year 2025 company	Total remuneration in cash	Gross profit of the shares or consolidated financial instruments consolidated	Remuneration from savings systems	Remuneration for other concepts	Total financial year 2025 group	
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	1,641				1,641	0				0	1,641
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	269				269					0	269
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	2,848	1,674		116	4,638	309				309	4,947
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	345				345					0	345
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	119				119					0	119
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	58				58					0	58
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	70				70					0	70
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	73				73					0	73
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	212				212	750				750	962

Name	Remuneration accrued in the company					Remuneration accrued in group companies					Total financial year 2025 company + group
	Total remuneration in cash	Gross profit of the shares or consolidated financial instruments consolidated	Remuneration from savings systems	Remuneration for other concepts	Total financial year 2025 company	Total remuneration in cash	Gross profit of the shares or consolidated financial instruments consolidated	Remuneration from savings systems	Remuneration for other concepts	Total financial year 2025 group	
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	170				170					0	170
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	119				119	45				45	164
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO	153				153					0	153
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	298				298					0	298
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	188				188					0	188
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	106				106					0	106
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	123				123					0	123
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLÁ	170				170					0	170
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASIÁ	58				58					0	58
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	296				296					0	296
Total	7,316	1,674	0	116	9,106	1,104	0	0	0	1,104	10,210

C.2 Indicate the changes over the last five years in the amount and percentage of the remuneration earned by each of the listed company's directors during the year, in the consolidated results of the company, and in the average remuneration on a full-time equivalent basis of the employees of the company and its subsidiaries who are not directors of the listed company.

	Total amounts accrued and % annual variation								
	Financial year 2025	% chg. 2025/2024	Financial year 2024	% chg. 2024/2023	Financial year 2023	% chg. 2023/2022	Financial year 2022	% chg. 2022/2021	Financial year 2021
Executive directors									
Mr GONZALO GORTÁZAR ROTAECHE	4,947	22.18%	4,049	15.98%	3,491	6.56%	3,276	11.09%	2,949
External directors									
Mr TOMÁS MUNIESA ARANTEGUI	1,641	156.41%	640	-4.19%	668	-0.30%	670	0.30%	668
Ms MARÍA AMPARO MORALEDA MARTÍNEZ	269	15.95%	232	-0.85%	234	0.86%	232	12.62%	206
Mr EDUARDO JAVIER SANCHIZ IRAZU	345	13.11%	305	6.27%	287	24.78%	230	—%	230
Mr LUIS ÁLVAREZ SATORRE	119								
Mr JOAQUIN AYUSO GARCÍA	58	-68.48%	184	2.79%	179	5.29	170	31.78%	129
Mr FRANCISCO JAVIER CAMPO GARCÍA	70	-67.59%	216	6.93%	202	18.82	170	31.78%	129
Ms EVA CASTILLO SANZ	73	-68.53%	232	8.41%	214	25.88	170	31.78%	129
Mr FERNANDO MARÍA COSTA DUARTE ULRICH	962	3.00%	934	0.54%	929	0.98	920	4.66%	879
Ms MARÍA VERÓNICA FISAS VERGES	170	12.58%	151	-5.63%	160	-15.79	190	—%	190
Mr PABLO ARTURO FORERO CALDERÓN	164								
Ms ROSA MARÍA GARCÍA PIÑEIRO	153								
Ms CRISTINA GARMENDIA MENDIZÁBAL	298	37.96%	216	2.86%	210	5.00	200	—%	200

	Total amounts accrued and % annual variation								
	Financial year 2025	% chg. 2025/2024	Financial year 2024	% chg. 2024/2023	Financial year 2023	% chg. 2023/2022	Financial year 2022	% chg. 2022/2021	Financial year 2021
Mr PETER LÖSCHER	188	16.05%	162	63.64%	99				
Mr JOSÉ MARÍA MÉNDEZ ÁLVAREZ-CEDRÓN	106								
Mr BERNARDO SÁNCHEZ INCERA	123								
Ms MARIA TERESA SANTERO QUINTILLA	170	12.58%	151	2.72%	147	5.00	140	30.84%	107
Mr JOSÉ SERNA MASÍA	58	-68.48%	184	2.79%	179	5.29	170	4.29%	163
Ms KORO USARRAGA UNSAIN	296	11.28%	266	0.76%	264	5.60	250	—%	250
Consolidated results of the company	8,674	4.27%	8,319	20.15%	6,924	60.06	4,326	-18.61%	5,315
Average employee remuneration	82	5.13%	78	5.41%	74	8.82	68	6.25%	64

Comments ¹:

For the calculation of average employee remuneration, wage and salary items have been included, as well as other items included in other staff expenses (defined contribution to the Pension Plan (savings and risk), health insurance, study grants, etc. without consolidation adjustments or employer social security contributions. This amount is calculated based on the CaixaBank Group's headcount at year-end.

Variations in directors' remuneration:

The change in Mr Gortázar's remuneration from 2021 to 2022 is due to the higher accrual of variable remuneration in 2022. The amount of annual fixed and target variable remuneration has been the same for both years.

From 2021 to 2022, the remaining remuneration increases of the rest of directors are due to arrivals in 2021 or changes in delegated committees, while remuneration for belonging to the Board or delegated committees remained the same between 2021 and 2022.

At the 2023 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, a 5 % increase in the remuneration of the Board of Directors was approved, as well as in the remuneration of the Executive Directors for their executive functions, which explains the increase compared to 2022.

At the 2024 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, a 3 % increase in the remuneration of the Board of Directors was approved, as well as in the remuneration of the Executive Directors for their executive functions, which explains the increase compared to 2023.

At the 2025 Annual General Meeting of Shareholders, an average increase of 12.9 % in the remuneration of the Board of Directors was approved. In addition, the Chief Executive Officer's total remuneration was increased by 14.9 %.

As explained in the Section on Own Workforce in the consolidated management report, the ratio between the average annual total compensation of the workforce and that of the organisation's highest-paid individual (Chief Executive Officer) is 68. This figure differs from that can be calculated based on the results shown in Table C.2 due to the different criteria used to prepare the economic information.

D. OTHER INFORMATION OF INTEREST

This annual report on the remuneration of directors has been approved by the Company's Board of Directors, at its meeting held on:

[19/02/2026]

State whether any directors voted against or abstained from voting on the approval of this report.

Yes
 No

¹ These comments are not included in the official CNMV statistical report due to technical impossibilities, but should be taken into account for the correct interpretation of the Statistical Appendix.